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INTRODUCTION	
	
“Justice	is	the	first	virtue	of	social	institutions,	as	truth	is	of	systems	of	thought.”	–	
John	Rawls1	
	
In	an	age	of	rapid	advancement	in	the	fields	of	science	and	technology,	it	is	
becoming	 increasingly	 important	 to	 ensure	 that	 the	 branches	 of	 government	
responsible	for	crafting	and	evaluating	laws	that	safeguard	public	interests	do	so	in	
																																																												
*	 Indiana	 University	Maurer	 School	 of	 Law,	 J.D./M.A.	 (expected	 2018);	 Kansas	 City	 University	M.A.	
Bioethics	 (2012);	 Oglethorpe	 University	 B.S.	 Biopsychology	 (2011).	 I	 would	 like	 to	 extend	 my	 gratitude	 to	
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also	immensely	grateful	to	the	Indiana	Journal	of	Law	and	Social	Equality	associates	and	editorial	team	for	their	
careful	review	of	my	work,	for	the	time	they	spent	improving	this	Note	for	publication,	and	for	the	speed	with	
which	they	did	so	after	 the	Supreme	Court	granted	certiorari	 in	Whole	Woman's	Health	v.	Hellerstedt.	They	
helped	me	to	develop	the	very	best	version	of	my	Note,	and	for	that	I	am	deeply	grateful.	For	lifelong	editorial	
assistance,	unparalleled	support	and	dedication	to	my	success	in	all	endeavors,	and	for	the	example	he	sets	as	
a	Renaissance	and	family	man,	I	am	forever	indebted	to	my	father,	Richard	von	Ende.	For	stimulating	a	life-
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moral	compass	with	which	she	endowed	me,	I	am	profoundly	grateful	to	my	mother,	Dr.	Harriet	Langley.	For	
unwavering	 moral,	 emotional,	 and	 cognitive	 support	 through	 this	 process	 and	 all	 others,	 I	 am	 immensely	
grateful	 to	Katie	Cullum,	Glenn	Drew,	 Judy	Elliott,	 Joshua	Goller,	Walter	Ricci,	 Jerry	Stolov,	Liz	Thompson,	
and	 Elizabeth,	Matthew,	 and	 Jennifer	 von	 Ende.	 I	 am	 also	 thankful	 to	 Professor	 Steve	 Sanders	 for	 helpful	
insights	on	earlier	drafts	and	for	research	opportunities	that	provided	continued	motivation	to	address	these	
fundamental	constitutional	issues.	For	enabling	my	legal	education,	I	also	appreciate	the	financial	support	of	
Indiana	University	and	the	many	alumni	who	have	contributed	to	scholarship	programs	and	funded	fellowship	
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1		 JOHN	RAWLS,	A	THEORY	OF	JUSTICE	3	(1971).	
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an	 informed,	 honest,	 and	 responsible	 manner.	 This	 is	 particularly	 true	 in	 the	
sphere	 of	women’s	 reproductive	 health.	 There	 are	 various	 areas	 of	 law	 in	which	
science	 and	 technology	 play	 an	 important	 role,	 including	 environmental	 law,	
regulation	 of	 the	 Internet,	 criminal	 sentencing,	 intellectual	 property,	 and	 many	
others.	 Both	 science	 and	 law	 are	 disciplines	 aimed	 at	 the	 realization	 of	 specific	
values:	 truth	 and	 justice,	 respectively.	 The	 scientific	method	 and	 both	 common	
and	constitutional	law	have	institutionalized	features	of	deliberate	review	in	order	
to	 achieve	 these	 goals.	 Likewise,	 both	 disciplines	 can	 claim	 credit	 for	 providing	
people	across	the	world	with	the	capability	of	enjoying	greater	liberties	as	a	result	
of	advancements	in	each	respective	field.		
	 As	important	a	consideration	as	scientific	validity	should	be	when	assessing	
the	 credibility	 of	 a	 law	 aimed	 at	 protecting	women’s	 health,	 it	 is	 also	 critical	 to	
discern	other	social	facts	with	heightened	scrutiny	when	making	such	an	analysis.2	
Unfortunately,	 abortion	 policymaking	 in	 the	 United	 States	 often	 fails	 to	
contemplate	these	social	facts—and	the	current	statistics	that	implicate	these	facts	
are	 staggering.	 World	 Health	 Organization	 reports	 indicate	 that	 women	 in	 the	
United	States	experience	some	of	the	worst	maternal3	and	infant4	mortality	rates	of	
any	 developed	 country.	 The	 National	 Institutes	 of	 Health	 issued	 a	 report	
discussing	 the	 maternal	 death	 problem	 in	 the	 United	 States,	 explaining,	 “[t]he	
United	 States	 has	 a	 higher	 ratio	 of	 maternal	 deaths	 than	 at	 least	 40	 other	
countries,	even	 though	 it	 spends	more	money	per	capita	 for	maternity	care	 than	
any	other.”5		
The	 Guttmacher	 Institute	 published	 findings	 in	 an	 updated	 fact	 sheet	
detailing	the	social	facts	relating	to	pregnancy	and	women	who	seek	abortions.	Of	
particular	relevance	are	the	following	figures:	half	of	all	pregnancies	in	the	United	
States	are	unintended;6	 three	 in	 ten	American	women	will	obtain	an	abortion	 in	
their	lifetimes;7	61%	of	those	obtaining	abortions	are	mothers	and	34%	are	women	
																																																												
2		 See	Caitlin	E.	Borgmann,	Judicial	Evasion	and	Disingenuous	Legislative	Appeals	to	Science	in	
the	Abortion	Controversy,	 17	 J.L.	&	POL’Y	 15,	 16–17	(2008);	Reva	Siegel,	Reasoning	 from	the	Body:	A	
Historical	Perspective	on	Abortion	Regulation	and	Questions	of	Equal	Protection,	 44	STAN.	L.	REV.	
261,	264–65	(1992).	
3		 Maternity	Care	in	the	US,	AM.	C.	NURSE-MIDWIVES	1,	http://www.midwife.org/acnm/files/cc	
LibraryFiles/Filename/000000003784/MACPACAttachmentFinal1-6-14.pdf	(last	visited	Oct.	6,	2015)	
(the	United	States	ranked	46th	in	the	world	in	maternal	mortality	in	2012).	Compare	World	Health	
Org.,	World	Health	Statistics	2014,	 at	86	 (2014)	 (28	maternal	deaths	per	 100,000	 live	births	 in	 the	
United	States),	with	id.	at	90	(average	of	seventeen	maternal	deaths	per	100,000	live	births	in	high	
income	countries).	
4		 Maternity	Care	in	the	US,	supra	note	3,	at	1	(the	United	States	ranked	27th	in	the	world	in	
infant	mortality).	
5		 Ina	 May	 Gaskin,	Maternal	 Death	 in	 the	 United	 States:	 A	 Problem	 Solved	 or	 a	 Problem	
Ignored?,	17	J.	PERINATAL	EDUC.	9,	9	(2008).	
6		 Fact	 Sheet:	 Unintended	 Pregnancy	 in	 the	 United	 States,	 GUTTMACHER	 INST.	 1	 (July	 2015),	
http://www.guttmacher.org/pubs/FB-Unintended-Pregnancy-US.html.	
7		 Fact	Sheet:	Induced	Abortion	in	the	United	States,	GUTTMACHER	INST.	1	(March	2016),	
http://www.guttmacher.org/pubs/FB_Induced_Abortion.html.	
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with	more	than	one	child;8	and	more	laws	regulating	women’s	reproductive	health	
have	been	passed	in	the	2011–	13	period	than	in	the	decade	prior.9	Various	national	
medical	 associations	 have	 published	 policy	 statements	 or	 passed	 resolutions	
demonstrating	 the	 medical	 profession’s	 disapproval	 of	 many	 recently	 enacted	
reproductive	 health	 care	 restrictions.10	 Furthermore,	 a	 USA	 Today/Gallup	 poll	
from	December	 2012	 indicates	 that	 53%	 of	 Americans	would	 not	 like	 to	 see	 the	
Supreme	Court	completely	overrule	Roe	v.	Wade,11	and	over	half	support	keeping	
abortion	legal	in	all	or	most	cases.12		
In	 addition	 to	 the	 social	 facts	 implicated	 in	 this	 area	 of	 policymaking,	
National	 Advocates	 for	 Pregnant	 Women,	 a	 policy-	 and	 litigation-focused	
advocacy	organization	spearheaded	by	Lynn	Paltrow,	published	a	report	detailing	
an	emerging	trend	toward	the	criminalization	of	pregnant	women	who	engage	in	
certain	 acts.13	 The	 report	 describes	 the	 forced	 arrest	 of	 hundreds	 of	 pregnant	
women	 for	 violation	 of	 laws	 that	were	 either	 not	 intended	 to	 apply	 to	 pregnant	
women	or	based	on	junk	science.14		
An	 analysis	 of	 these	 social	 facts	 provides	 multiple	 insights.	 First,	
reproductive	 health	 care	 and	 access	 to	 it	 in	 the	 U.S.	 are	 overwhelmingly	
inadequate.15	Second,	the	anti-choice	messaging	around	contraception,	pregnancy,	
and	abortion	 is	both	successful16	and	 largely	misrepresentative.17	Third,	 it	 is	clear	
																																																												
8		 Rachel	 K.	 Jones,	 Lawrence	 B.	 Finer	 &	 Susheela	 Singh,	 Characteristics	 of	 U.S.	 Abortion	
Patients,	2008,	GUTTMACHER	INST.	3,	8	(May	2010),	https://www.guttmacher.org/pubs/US-Abortion-
Patients.pdf.		
9		 Elizabeth	 Nash,	 Rachel	 Benson	 Gold,	 Andrea	 Rowan,	 Gwendolyn	 Rathburn	 &	 Yana	
Vierboom,	Laws	Affecting	Reproductive	Health	 and	Rights:	 2013	 State	 Policy	 Review,	 GUTTMACHER	
INST.,	http://www.guttmacher.org/statecenter/updates/2013/statetrends42013.html	(last	visited	Oct.	
2,	2015).	
10		 Andrea	 D.	 Friedman,	 Bad	 Medicine:	 Abortion	 and	 the	 Battle	 Over	 for	 Who	 Speaks	 for	
Women’s	Health,	20	WM.	&	MARY	J.	WOMEN	&	L.	45,	46–47	(2013).	
11		 Lydia	 Saad,	Majority	 of	 Americans	 Still	 Support	Roe	 v.	Wade	Decision,	 GALLUP	 (Jan.	 22,	
2013),	http://www.gallup.com/poll/160058/majority-americans-support-roe-wade-decision.aspx.	
12		 Data	 Trends:	 Abortion,	 PEW	 RESEARCH	 CTR.,	 http://www.pewresearch.org/data-
trend/domestic-issues/abortion/	 (last	 updated	 Sept.	 22,	 2014);	 Press	 Release,	 NARAL	 Pro-Choice	
Am.,	 Gallup	 Shows	 Support	 for	 Legal	 Abortion	 Remains	 Strong	 (May	 23,	 2012),	
http://www.prochoiceamerica.org/media/press-releases/2012/pr05232012_gallup.html.	
13		 LYNN	M.	PALTROW	&	 JEANNE	FLAVIN,	ARRESTS	OF	AND	FORCED	 INTERVENTIONS	
ON	 PREGNANT	WOMEN	 IN	 THE	 UNITED	 STATES,	 1973–2005:	 IMPLICATIONS	 FOR	WOMEN'S	
LEGAL	STATUS	AND	PUBLIC	HEALTH,	38	J.	HEALTH	POL.,	POL’Y	&	L.	299	(2013).	
14		 Id.	
15		 Rachel	Hansen	&	Rebecca	Newman,	Health	Care:	Access	After	Health	Care	Reform,	16	GEO.	
J.	GENDER	&	L.	191,	193–94	(2015)	(demonstrating	that	various	reasons	including	coverage	gaps,	high	
medical	 costs,	 poor	 rural	 health	 care,	 and	 burdensome	 reproductive	 health	 restrictions	 lead	 to	
inadequate	care).	
16		 See,	e.g.,	ALESHA	DOAN,	OPPOSITION	AND	INTIMIDATION:	THE	ABORTION	WARS	AND	STRATEGIES	
OF	POLITICAL	HARASSMENT	4	 (2007);	 SARAH	ERDREICH,	GENERATION	ROE:	 INSIDE	 THE	FUTURE	OF	 THE	
PRO-CHOICE	MOVEMENT	179	(2013).	
Indiana	Journal	of	Law	and	Social	Equality	 Vol.	4,	Issue	1	
	
	24	
that	state	 legislatures’	unscrupulous	use	of	science	and	pseudoscience	 in	crafting	
laws	 to	 regulate	 pregnant	 women,	 and	 the	 courts’	 failure	 to	 call	 them	 on	 their	
bluff,	is	becoming	a	significant	problem.18		
Instead	of	 looking	at	 reliable,	 illustrative	 social	 statistics,	 legislatures	have	
relied	 on	 junk	 science	 and	 debunked	 theories	 in	 order	 to	 propose	 and	 pass	
hundreds	 of	 morality-based	 laws	 regulating	 women’s	 reproductive	 health.19	
Moreover,	courts	have	entertained	and	dismissed	challenges	to	these	laws	without	
critically	assessing	the	science	that	purportedly	underpins	 them.	These	 laws	take	
several	 forms20	 and	 constitute	 an	 incremental	 strategy	 to	 make	 abortions	
unavailable—even	 absent	 a	 reversal	 of	 Roe	 v.	 Wade.21	 Targeted	 regulations	 of	
abortion	 providers	 (“TRAP	 laws”)	 	 regulate	 both	 providers	 and	 clinics	 that	 offer	
abortion	 services.22	 Fetal	 protection	 laws	 (FPLs)	 are	 laws	 that	 purport	 to	protect	
the	 state’s	 interest	 in	 potential	 life—an	 interest	 originally	 recognized	 in	 Roe.	 23	
FPLs	take	multiple	forms	and	can	designate	a	pregnant	women	a	criminal	for	her	
current	 or	 previous	 drug	 use	 or	 for	 seeking	 addiction	 treatment.	 Other	 FPLs	
impose	 outright	 bans	 on	 abortion	 after	 a	 specified	 gestational	 age	 on	 the	 faulty	
premise	 of	 fetal	 pain.	 Additionally,	 there	 are	 informed	 consent	 laws	 that	 aim	 to	
regulate	 women	 seeking	 abortion	 services	 by	 requiring	 the	 provision	 of	
																																																																																																																																																																																	
17		 Shaniqua	 Seth	 &	 Malika	 Redmond,	 Billboards,	 Women	 of	 Color,	 and	 Politics,	 NAT’L	
WOMEN’S	 HEALTH	 NETWORK	 (May/June	 2012),	 https://nwhn.org/newsletter/node/1402	
[http://web.archive.org/web/20121019185228/http://nwhn.org/newsletter/node/1402].	
18		 Friedman,	supra	note	9,	at	pt.	3;	see	also	B.	Jessie	Hill,	Reproductive	Rights	as	Health	Care	
Rights,	18	COLUM.	J.	GENDER	&	L.	501,	501	(2009);	Medical	and	Social	Health	Benefits:	Since	Abortion	
was	 Made	 Legal	 in	 the	 U.S.,	 PLANNED	 PARENTHOOD,	
http://www.plannedparenthood.org/files/4713/96	
11/5762/Abortion_Medical_and_Social_Benefits.pdf	(last	updated	Feb.	2014).	
19		 Caroline	Mala	Corbin,	Abortion	Distortions,	71	WASH.	&	LEE	L.	REV.	1175	(2014).	
20		 Proof	 of	 the	 GOP	 War	 on	 Women,	 POLITICUSUSA	 (May	 13,	 2011),	
http://www.politicususa.com	
/proof-war-women-2.	
21		 See,	e.g.,	Irin	Carmon,	The	Right’s	Plan	to	Reverse	Roe:	Ban	Abortions	to	 ‘Protect’	Women,	
MSNBC	(Sept.	 13,	2013,	8:47	AM),	http://www.msnbc.com/msnbc/the-rights-plan-reverse-roe-ban;	
Amanda	Marcotte	&	Jesse	Taylor,	How	States	Could	Ban	Abortion	With	‘Roe’	Still	Standing,	NATION	
(July	 14,	 2011),	 http://www.thenation.com/article/162033/how-states-could-ban-abortion-roe-still-
standing;	Michael	New,	Incremental	Pro-Life	Legislative	Success	Gives	Future	Hope,	LIFENEWS.COM	
(Aug.	 9,	 2012,	 10:16	 AM),	 http://www.lifenews.com/2012/08/09/incremental-pro-life-legislative-
success-gives-future-hope/;	 Memorandum	 from	 James	 Bopp,	 Jr.	 &	 Richard	 E.	 Coleson,	 Bopp,	
Coleson	 &	 Bostrom,	 Pro-Life	 Strategy	 Issues	 5	 (Aug.	 7,	 2007),	
http://operationrescue.org/pdfs/Bopp%20Mem	
o%20re%20State%20HLA.pdf.	
22		 State	 Laws	 Regulating	 Reproductive	 Rights,	 LAW	 STUDENTS	 FOR	 REPRODUCTIVE	 JUSTICE,	
http://lsrj.org/documents/factsheets/13_State_Laws_Regulating_Repro_Rights.pdf	 (last	 updated	
Aug.	2013).	
23		 Michele	 Goodwin,	 Fetal	 Protection	 Laws:	 Moral	 Panic	 and	 the	 New	 Constitutional	
Battlefront,	102	CALIF.	L.	REV.	781,	787	(2014);	see	also	Roe	v.	Wade,	410	U.S.	113,	156	(1973).	
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unnecessary	 procedures	 like	 ultrasounds,	 counseling,	 and	 compulsory	 waiting	
periods.	
The	 medical	 community	 largely	 opposes	 these	 morality-driven	 laws,	 as	
evidenced	 by	 the	 various	 amicus	 curiae	 filings,	 legislative	 testimonies,	 and	
publications	 provided	 by	 representatives	 of	 national	 medical	 organizations.24	
Furthermore,	 the	 validity	 of	 the	 claim	 that	 these	 laws	 are	 passed	 in	 order	 to	
promote	 the	 State’s	 interest	 in	women’s	 health	has	 been	 called	 into	 question	by	
various	statements	made	to	reporters	or	documented	in	 legislative	records.25	The	
effect	of	these	laws	on	women’s	access	to	reproductive	health	services	is	significant	
and	disproportionately	impacts	poor	women,	rural	women,	and	women	of	color.26	
This	 Note	 first	 establishes	 the	 current	 trend	 of	 legislatures’	 unscrupulous	
use	of	science	in	regulating	women’s	health	and	discusses	the	impact	of	these	laws	
on	 individual	 choice,	 societal	 values	 and	 interests,	 and	 national	 reproductive	
health.	This	Note	 then	examines	 the	potential	 implications	of	 a	 continued	 trend	
and	proposes	several	possible	ways	of	addressing	this	problem.	
Part	I	of	this	Note	documents	the	role	of	the	federal	courts	in	establishing	a	
legal	 framework	 that	 permits	 the	 passage	 of	 onerous	 and	medically	 unnecessary	
restrictions	by	 state	 governments.	 Part	 II	 explores	 the	 various	 types	 of	 laws	 that	
have	been	enacted	and	their	misleading	justifications,	specifically	those	regulating	
women’s	reproductive	health	under	 the	guise	of	protecting	the	State’s	 interest	 in	
the	health	of	 the	mother	and	the	 fetus.	Part	 II.B.i	profiles	TRAP	 laws,	Part	 II.B.ii	
summarizes	 the	 criminalization	 of	 substance	 abuse	 by	 pregnant	 women,	 Part	
II.B.iii	outlines	the	proliferation	of	fetal	pain	abortion	bans,	and	Part	II.B.iv	reviews	
the	several	variations	of	informed	consent	laws.	Analyses	of	these	restrictions	will	
illustrate	 the	 inaccuracy	 of	 their	 purported	 scientific	 underpinnings	 and	 the	
continuing	opposition	by	medical	and	legal	communities.	Part	III	briefly	discusses	
the	 potential	 technologies	 that	 may	 be	 implicated	 in	 a	 continued	 trend	 of	
legislatures	 basing	 health	 care	 restrictions	 on	 faulty	 science.	 Finally,	 Part	 IV	
proposes	 recommendations	 for	 how	 courts	 and	 activists	 can	 reverse	 this	 trend,	
																																																												
24		 E.g.,	 Steven	 E.	Weinberger,	 Hal	 C.	 Lawrence,	 III,	 Douglas	 E.	 Henley,	 Errol	 R.	 Alden,	 &	
David	 B.	Hoyt,	Legislative	 Interference	with	 the	 Patient-Physician	 Relationship,	 NEW	ENG.	 J.	MED,	
July–Dec.	2012,	at	1557,	1557–59;	Leading	Medical	Groups	Oppose	Obstacles	to	Abortion,	NARAL	PRO-
CHOICE	 AM.	 (July	 10,	 2002),	
https://web.archive.org/web/20060117003817/http://www.naral.org/facts/loader.cfm	
?url=/commonspot/security/getfile.cfm&PageID=1715;	Policy	Statement,	Am.	Coll.	of	Obstetricians	
&	 Gynecologists,	 Abortion	 Policy	 (Nov.	 2014),	 http://acog.org/-/media/Statements-of-
Policy/Public/sop069.pdf?la=en.	 The	 laws	 are	 also	 opposed	 by	 medical	 sociologists.	 E.g.,	 Policy	
Statement,	 Soc’y	 for	 Med.	 Anthropology	 (July	 2014),	 http://www.medanthro.net/demo/wp-
content/uploads/2014/07/CAR-PS.pdf.	
25		 See,	e.g.,	Tara	Culp-Ressler,	Mississippi	Governor:	 ‘My	Goal	of	Course	 is	to	Shut	Down’	the	
State’s	 Last	 Abortion	 Clinic,	 THINKPROGRESS	 (Jan.	 11,	 2013,	 10:55	 AM),	
http://thinkprogress.org/health/	
2013/01/11/1434991/mississippi-governor-shut-down-clinic/.	
26		 Laurie	 Nsiah-Jefferson,	Reproductive	 Laws,	Women	 of	 Color,	 and	 Low-Income	Women,	 11	
WOMEN’S	RTS.	L.	REP.	15,	16–17	(1989).	
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suggesting	three	separate	and	complementary	approaches:	1)	decreased	deference	
to	 legislative	 fact-finding,	 2)	 the	 recognition	 of	 an	 implicit	 right	 to	 medical	
decision	 making,	 and	 3)	 increased	 focus	 by	 pro-choice	 groups	 and	 progressive	
news	 outlets	 on	 reporting	 these	 problems	 and	 successful	 messaging	 campaigns	
around	reproductive	health	as	a	political	issue.	
	
	
	
I.		 THE	 ROLE	 OF	 FEDERAL	 COURTS	 IN	 RECOGNIZING	 WOMEN’S	
INTEREST	IN	REPRODUCTIVE	HEALTH	
	
“I	 don’t	 think	 the	 law	 exists	 to	 arrive	 at	 the	 truth.	 .	 .	 .	 There's	 an	 enormous	
difference	between	the	role	of	truth	in	law	and	the	role	of	truth	in	science.	In	law,	
truth	is	one	among	many	goals.”	–	Alan	Dershowitz27	
	
	
A.		 In	Search	of	a	Workable	Doctrine	
A	 woman’s	 right	 to	 an	 abortion	 is	 supported	 by	 several	 constitutional	
theories;	 for	 example,	 due	 process	 privacy	 rights,	 the	 Equal	 Protection	 clause,28	
and	 the	 Ninth	 Amendment29	 have	 been	 asserted	 by	 academics,	 litigators,	 and	
Supreme	 Court	 Justices	 alike.30	 The	 current	 social,	 legal,	 and	 political	 climate	
surrounding	access	to	reproductive	health	services	has	been	shaped	by	centuries	of	
traditional	 cultural	 practices	 and	 social	 transformations,	 and,	 more	 recently,	 by	
rights	movements	and	evolving	legal	doctrine.	
	
	
																																																												
27		 Kathryn	Schulz,	Alan	Dershowitz	on	Being	Wrong,	Part	II:	Error	in	the	Law,	SLATE	(May	12,	
2010,	5:32	PM),	http://www.slate.com/blogs/thewrongstuff/2010/05/12/alan_dershowitz_on_being_	
wrong_part_ii_error_in_the_law.html.	
28		 Ruth	 Bader	 Ginsburg,	 Some	 Thoughts	 on	 Autonomy	 and	 Equality	 in	 Relation	 to	 Roe	 v.	
Wade,	63	N.C.	L.	REV.	375,	375–76	(1985).	
29		 Roe	v.	Wade,	410	U.S.	113,	210–11	(1973)	(Douglas,	J.,	concurring).	
30		 In	 this	 author’s	 opinion,	 however,	 abortion	 jurisprudence	 is	 properly	 situated	within	 the	
broader	jurisprudential	field	addressing	the	right	to	medical	decision-making,	implicitly	protected	
by	the	due	process	clause	of	 the	 fifth	and	fourteenth	amendments.	This	domain	of	 law	addresses	
end	of	life	care,	informed	consent	requirements,	competence	and	capacity	requirements	in	medical	
decision-making	by	minors,	and	the	prescription	and	use	of	medicinal	marijuana.	Within	this	field	
of	law,	two	doctrines	have	emerged,	one	that	elevates	autonomy	and	self-determination	as	primary	
values	and	another	 that	defers	 to	the	state	 interest	 in	protecting	public	health.	B.	 Jessie	Hill,	The	
Constitutional	Right	to	Make	Medical	Treatment	Decisions:	A	Tale	of	Two	Doctrines,	86	TEX.	L.	REV	
277,	294–295	(2007).	
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B.	 Pre-Roe	
Historians	 and	 legal	 scholars	 recognize	 that	 women	 have	 engaged	 in	
abortion	procedures	across	different	cultures	for	centuries.31	However,	it	was	only	
beginning	in	the	1800s	that	laws	across	the	United	States	began	to	criminalize	this	
act.32	 The	 history	 of	 U.S.	 common	 law	 demonstrates	 that	 the	 fetus	 was	 not	
considered	the	equivalent	of	a	person.33	In	adjudicating	disputes	around	individual	
actions	 that	 unintentionally	 destroyed	 a	 fetus,	 whether	 the	 fetus	 had	 quickened	
was	a	dispositive	factor	in	assessing	the	extent	of	the	harm	imposed;	specifically,	in	
determining	whether	the	loss	of	the	child	would	be	treated	as	a	homicide	or	as	a	
civil	damage	for	which	compensation	would	suffice.34	
Initially,	 it	 was	 the	 organized	 medical	 profession	 that	 led	 the	 effort	 to	
criminalize	 abortion.35	 Some	 historical	 accounts	 attribute	 the	 criminalization	 of	
abortion	 to	 a	 backlash	 that	 developed	 among	 medical	 professionals,	 state	
authorities,	 and	 the	 public	 in	 hopes	 of	 tightening	 control	 over	 women	 and	 in	
response	to	societal	changes	brought	about	by	suffrage,	birth	control,	and	the	use	
of	 midwives.36	 Regardless	 of	 the	 impetus	 for	 criminalization,	 it	 is	 clear	 that	
lawyers,	 physicians,	 and	 public	 health	 officials	 were	 instrumental	 in	 reshaping	
public	policy	 to	avoid	 the	 life-threatening	 trend	of	 illegal	and	unsafe	abortions.37	
Activists,	 scholars,	 and	 professionals	 played	 key	 roles	 in	 setting	 the	 stage	 for	 a	
monumental	 Supreme	 Court	 decision	 that	 would	 finally	 provide	 protections	 for	
the	important	personal	and	state	interests	at	stake	in	making	abortions	legal	and	
accessible.	
	
	
																																																												
31		 E.g.,	Rochelle	N.	Shain,	A	Cross-Cultural	History	of	Abortion,	13	OBSTETRICS	&	GYNECOLOGY	
CLINICS	N.	AM.	1,	1	(1986);	Medical	and	Social	Health	Benefits:	Since	Abortion	Was	Made	Legal	in	the	
U.S.,	 PLANNED	 PARENTHOOD	 1,	
http://www.plannedparenthood.org/files/4713/9611/5762/Abortion_M	
edical_and_Social_Benefits.pdf	 (last	updated	Feb.	 2014)	 (noting	 that	over	 200,000	 abortions	were	
performed	 in	 the	 United	 States	 in	 the	 1950s	 and	 1960s);	 Timeline,	 4000	 YEARS	 FOR	 CHOICE,	
http://www.4000yearsforchoice.com/pages/timeline	[https://web.archive.org/web/20140318233559/	
http://www.4000yearsforchoice.com/pages/timeline].	
32		 Katha	 Pollitt,	 Abortion	 in	 American	 History,	 ATLANTIC	 (May	 1997),	
http://www.theatlantic.co	
m/magazine/archive/1997/05/abortion-in-american-history/376851/.	
33		 Roe,	410	U.S.	at	162	(recognizing	that	the	law	has	never	treated	fetuses	as	whole	persons).	
34		 LESLIE	J.	REAGAN,	WHEN	ABORTION	WAS	A	CRIME:	WOMEN,	MEDICINE,	AND	LAW	IN	THE	UNITED	
STATES	1867–1973,	at	8–13	(1997);	see	also	Linda	J.	Wharton,	Roe	at	Thirty-Six	and	Beyond:	Enhancing	
Protection	for	Abortion	Rights	Through	State	Constitutions,	15	WM.	&	MARY	J.	WOMEN	&	L.	469,	519	
n.306	(2009).		
35		 LINDA	GREENHOUSE	&	REVA	B.	SIEGEL,	BEFORE	ROE	V.	WADE	3	(2012),	http://documents.law.ya	
le.edu/sites/default/files/BeforeRoe2ndEd_1.pdf.	
36		 History	 of	 Abortion	 in	 the	 U.S.,	 OUR	 BODIES	 OURSELVES	 (Mar.	 28,	 2014),	
http://www.ourbodies	
ourselves.org/health-info/u-s-abortion-history/.	
37		 GREENHOUSE	&	SIEGEL,	supra	note	34,	at	3–4.	
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C.		 Recognizing	a	Fundamental	Right:	Roe	v.	Wade	
The	right	to	an	abortion,	first	recognized	in	the	1973	decision	Roe	v.	Wade,	38	
has	evolved	since	the	interests	at	play	were	first	pronounced	in	that	historic	ruling.	
The	 majority	 opinion	 in	 Roe	 situated	 abortion	 within	 the	 context	 of	 the	 (then	
relatively	 recent)	 expansion	 of	 due	 process	 liberty	 doctrine.	 The	 Court	 declared	
that	 the	 right	 earlier	 outlined	 in	 Griswold	 v.	 Connecticut,39	 and	 subsequently	
understood	 as	 a	 right	 of	 privacy	 encompassed	 in	 the	Due	 Process	 Clause	 of	 the	
Fourteenth	 Amendment,	 is	 “broad	 enough	 to	 encompass	 a	 woman’s	 decision	
whether	or	not	to	terminate	her	pregnancy.”40	
Roe	articulated	a	legal	balancing	test	to	weigh	the	three	conflicting	interests	
that	 must	 be	 considered	 when	 determining	 which	 regulations	 of	 abortions	 are	
permissible	 and	when.	 First,	 the	 State	 recognized	 a	 woman’s	 interest	 in	 privacy	
and	self-determination.41	The	Roe	Court	also	recognized	the	interest	of	the	State	in	
protecting	women’s	 health	 and	 the	 additional	 interest	 of	 the	 State	 in	 protecting	
potential	life.42	
The	Court	 theorized	that	 these	 interests	could	be	weighed	differently	as	a	
pregnancy	progresses.43	The	majority	opinion	proposed	a	trimester	framework	that	
recognized	that	first	trimester	abortions	are	safer	than	childbirth	and	left	decisions	
about	 abortion	 in	 the	 first	 trimester	 up	 to	 the	 woman	 and	 her	 doctor.44	 The	
trimester	framework	only	permitted	those	restrictions	in	the	second	trimester	that	
had	 the	 effect	 of	 protecting	 women’s	 health.45	 The	 framework	 allowed	 bans	 on	
abortions	 after	 the	 third	 trimester—the	 time	 at	 which	 the	 feature	 of	 viability	
typically	 emerges	 in	 the	 fetus—if	 exceptions	 were	 made	 for	 the	 health	 of	 the	
mother.46	 Justice	 Douglas’s	 concurrence	 in	 Roe	 also	 pinpointed	 the	 Ninth	
Amendment’s	reservation	of	additional	rights	to	the	people	as	potential	bases	for	
this	outcome.	Roe	was	a	monumental	decision	because	it	recognized	abortion	as	a	
fundamental	right,	deserving	of	strict	scrutiny	in	the	courts.47	
	
	
D.	 Continued	Challenges	
The	 Supreme	 Court	 overturned	 several	 laws	 from	 1973	 through	 1992	 that	
attempted	 to	 regulate	 women’s	 access	 to	 abortion.	 With	 only	 three	 major	
exceptions	in	rejecting	dozens	of	laws,	the	Court	enforced	the	Roe	ruling	that	pre-
viability	regulations	would	survive	strict	scrutiny	only	if	they	served	to	protect	the	
																																																												
38		 410	U.S.	at	154.	
39		 381	U.S.	479	(1965).	
40		 Roe,	410	U.S.	at	153.			
41		 Id.	at	153.	
42		 Id.	at	155.	
43		 Id.	at	163–64.	
44		 Id.	
45		 Id.	
46		 Id.	
47		 Id.	at	167–71	(Stewart,	J.,	concurring).	
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health	 of	 the	 mother.	 	 In	 the	 1979	 case	 Bellotti	 v.	 Baird,	 the	 Court	 upheld	 a	
Massachusetts	 state	 law	 requiring	 a	 minor	 to	 obtain	 parental	 consent	 or	 to	
persuade	a	judge	of	her	maturity	before	obtaining	an	abortion.48	In	the	1980	Harris	
v.	 McRae	 decision,	 the	 Court	 held	 that	 Medicaid	 was	 not	 required	 to	 cover	
medically	 necessary	 abortions,	 despite	 being	 an	 otherwise	 comprehensive	health	
coverage	plan.49	
The	Court’s	1989	ruling	in	Webster	v.	Reproductive	Health	Services	upheld	a	
Missouri	 statute	 that	 prohibited	 public	 health	 workers	 or	 public	 facilities	 from	
participating	 in	 abortion	 procedures	 when	 unnecessary	 to	 save	 the	 life	 of	 the	
mother,	prohibited	counseling	or	other	encouragement	to	obtain	an	abortion,	and	
required	physicians	 to	perform	viability	 tests	 for	women	who	were	beyond	 their	
nineteenth	week	of	pregnancy.50	 In	a	5-4	decision,	 the	Court	 found	 the	Missouri	
statute	 constitutional,	 overturning	 lower	 court	 decisions	 that	 had	 struck	 the	
statute	down.	In	yet	another	placating	move,	which	professed	deference	in	name	
only,	 the	 Court	 claimed	 to	 hold	 to	 the	 fundamental	 portions	 essential	 to	 the	
original	holding	in	Roe.	The	Court	proclaimed	that	the	preamble	to	the	restrictions	
in	 the	statute,	which	asserted	 that	 life	begins	at	conception,	did	not	 functionally	
affect	 the	 law	 or	 restrict	 abortion,	 that	 there	 was	 no	 affirmative	 right	 requiring	
states	to	enter	the	business	of	abortion,	and	that	the	viability	test	served	the	State’s	
recognized	interest	in	protecting	potential	life.	
	
	
E.	 The	Liberty	Interest	and	Undue	Burden	Test:	An	Evolving	Standard	
Although	the	Court	has	continued	to	uphold	the	heart	of	 the	Roe	holding	
(recognition	and	protection	of	women’s	interest	in	and	ability	to	obtain	abortions),	
the	constitutional	protection	was	most	greatly	weakened	by	the	Court’s	1992	ruling	
in	Planned	Parenthood	of	Southeastern	Pennsylvania	v.	Casey.51	This	case	involved	a	
challenge	to	an	expansive	abortion	law	passed	in	Pennsylvania	with	provisions	that	
mandated	informed	consent,	a	twenty-four	hour	waiting	period,	and	both	parental	
consent	 (in	 the	 case	 of	 a	 minor)	 and	 spousal	 notification	 (with	 waiver	 options	
available	for	mitigating	circumstances).52	A	joint	concurrence	issued	by	the	Court’s	
centrist	 justices	 and	 the	Court’s	 conservative	 justices	 affirmed	 the	 principle	 that	
pre-viability	 abortions	 could	 not	 be	 banned	 but	 upheld	 all	 of	 the	 challenged	
provisions	except	the	spousal	notification	requirement.53		
The	Casey	decision	altered	the	standard	of	review	set	out	by	Roe	and	largely	
revised	 the	 trimester	 framework,	 dismantling	 the	 general	 protection	 for	 first	
trimester	 abortions	 against	 regulation	 and	 newly	 permitting	 any	 regulation	 that	
																																																												
48		 443	U.S.	622,	643–44	(1979).	
49		 448	U.S.	297,	311	(1980).	
50		 492	U.S.	490,	499–501	(1989).	
51		 505	U.S.	833	(1992).	
52		 Id.	at	844.	
53		 Casey,	505	U.S.	833.	
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does	not	have	the	“purpose	or	effect	of	placing	a	substantial	obstacle	in	the	path	of	
a	 woman	 seeking	 an	 abortion	 of	 a	 nonviable	 fetus.”54	 Most	 importantly,	 Casey	
established	a	new	standard	 for	evaluating	whether	regulations	unconstitutionally	
interfered	 with	 this	 protected	 liberty	 interest.	 The	 Court	 asserted	 that	 any	
regulation	that	imposes	a	substantial	obstacle,	thereby	constraining	a	woman	from	
obtaining	 a	 legal	 abortion,	 is	 considered	 an	 “undue	 burden,”	 which	 violates	 the	
constitutional	right	of	women	to	obtain	abortions.55	The	ruling	in	Casey,	however,	
upheld	 Roe’s	 reasoning,	 which	 declared	 that	 a	 woman’s	 decision	 to	 obtain	 an	
abortion	implicates	 liberty	interests	that	are	protected	from	State	interference	by	
the	Due	Process	Clauses	of	the	Fifth	and	Fourteenth	Amendments.56		
Casey	 was	 an	 impactful	 decision	 that	 functioned	 to	 placate	 activists	 who	
were	nervous	about	the	sustained	legality	of	abortion	under	the	 law.	The	Court’s	
transformative	 holding	 in	 Casey	 created	 a	 malleable	 and	 vague	 standard,	
permitting	increasing	numbers	of	state	regulations,	the	constitutionality	of	which	
is	constantly	being	drawn	 into	question.	Unfortunately,	as	Andrea	Friedman,	 the	
director	of	the	National	Partnership	for	Women	and	Families,	explained	of	Casey,		
	
[T]he	Court	[gave]	little	actual	guidance	as	to	how	this	standard	was	to	be	applied.	
This	ambiguity	of	the	standard	became	even	clearer	as	lower	courts	attempted	to	
put	 it	 into	effect.	The	plurality	of	 the	Court	 in	Casey	 found	that	 the	provision	of	
“truthful,	nonmisleading	information	about	the	nature	of	the	abortion	procedure,	
the	 attendant	 health	 risks	 and	 those	 of	 childbirth”	 was	 consistent	 with	 “Roe’s	
acknowledgment	of	an	important	interest	in	potential	life	.	.	.	.”57	
	
As	a	result,	Caitlin	Borgmann	explains,		
	
In	Planned	Parenthood	v.	Casey,	the	Court	explicitly	sanctioned	the	state's	reliance	
on	morality	as	the	basis	for	abortion	regulation.	Yet	the	decision,	which	upheld	a	
woman's	 right	 to	 abortion,	 placed	 limits	 on	 how	 the	 state	 could	 express	 or	
implement	 its	 preference	 for	 childbirth.	 Accepting	Casey's	invitation,	 legislatures	
have	enacted	a	wide	variety	of	restrictions	based	on	moral	opposition	to	abortion.	
But,	partly	in	response	to	the	confusing	legal	standard	set	forth	in	Casey,	they	have	
felt	compelled	to	disguise	these	moral	viewpoints	as	scientific	fact.58	
	
In	 2000,	 the	 Supreme	 Court	 accepted	 the	 State’s	 appeal	 of	 a	 Nebraska	
statute	that	had	been	overturned	by	lower	courts	as	in	contravention	of	the	undue	
burden	 standard.59	 The	 statute	 banned	 partial-birth	 abortions	 (a	 term	 that	 is	
functionally	meaningless	and	was	used	as	an	anti-choice	messaging	technique)	and	
																																																												
54		 Id.	at	877.		
55		 See	id.	at	874.	
56		 Id.	at	853,	871,	874.	
57		 Friedman,	supra	note	9,	at	50	(emphasis	omitted).	
58		 Borgmann,	supra	note	2,	at	16.	
59		 Sternberg	v.	Carhart,	530	U.S.	914	(2000).	
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forbade	a	particular	abortion	procedure	known	as	Dilation	and	Extraction	(D&E).60	
The	Supreme	Court	rejected	the	statute	in	a	5-4	ruling	that	was	closer	than	many	
expected,	with	Justice	Kennedy	siding	with	the	dissent	and	differentiating	between	
this	restriction	and	others	based	on	moral	questions	that	the	procedure	raised.61		
Only	 seven	 years	 later,	 in	 2007,	 the	 Supreme	 Court	 accepted	 a	 case	 for	
review	 that	challenged	 the	newly-passed	Partial	Birth	Abortion	Ban,62	which	had	
been	sponsored	by	the	Bush	Administration.	Gonzales	v.	Carhart63	was	a	startling	
5-4	decision	that	likely	reflected	the	changing	makeup	of	the	Court	more	than	any	
substantial	 difference	 between	 the	 federal	 law	 and	 the	 overturned	 Nebraska	
statute,	as	Justice	Samuel	Alito	had	replaced	Justice	Sandra	Day	O’Connor	on	the	
Court.	The	Court	upheld	the	federal	 law,	giving	great	deference	to	the	 legislative	
fact-finding	process	and	not	questioning	the	scientific	underpinnings	of	bases	for	
the	 law.64	 Justice	Ginsburg’s	 dissent	 decried	 the	Court’s	 decision,	 noting,	 among	
other	criticisms,	that	the	ruling	represented	the	first	time	the	Court	had	upheld	a	
restriction	 that	 did	 not	 provide	 an	 explicit	 exemption	 for	 the	 health	 of	 the	
mother.65	 Most	 disturbingly,	 Kennedy’s	 majority	 opinion	 articulated	 that,	 “[t]he	
Court	has	given	state	and	federal	legislatures	wide	discretion	to	pass	legislation	in	
areas	 where	 there	 is	 medical	 and	 scientific	 uncertainty,”66	 fostering	 an	
environment	 in	 which	 shoddy	 science	 could	 be	 used	 to	 create	 an	 inappropriate	
impression	or	 scientific	uncertainty	 and	 to	make	 room	 for	 laws	with	 illegitimate	
scientific	bases.67	
	
	
F.		 Current	State	of	the	Law	
In	current	doctrine,	the	law	is	still	bound	by	the	undue	burden	standard.	In	
reality,	the	state	of	the	law	is	in	confusion	regarding	the	proper	application	of	this	
standard.	 For	 example,	 the	 Supreme	 Court	 has	 employed	 the	 standard	 in	
upholding	 mandatory	 seventy-two	 hour	 delays	 and	 in	 rejecting	 spousal	
notification	 requirements,	 while	 both	 rejecting	 and	 upholding	 laws	 banning	
																																																												
60		 Id.	at	921–22.	
61		 Id.	at	946,	956–79.	
62		 18	U.S.C.	§	1531	(2012).	
63		 550	U.S.	124	(2007).	
64		 Id.	at	165–66,	168.	
65		 Id.	at	169–74	(Ginsburg,	J.,	dissenting).	
66		 Id.	at	163.	
67		 Cf.,	 e.g.,	 Ames	 Grawert,	 The	 Fundamental	 Meaning	 of	 “Medical	 Uncertainty”:	 Judicial	
Deference	 to	 Selective	 Science	 in	Gonzales	 v.	 Carhart,	 12	N.Y.U.	 J.	 LEGIS.	 &	 PUB.	 POL’Y	 379	 (2009);	
Sharona	Coutts	&	Sofia	Resnick,	How	Shoddy	Evidence	Finds	Its	Way	from	State	Legislatures	to	the	
U.S.	 Supreme	 Court,	 RH	 REALITY	 CHECK	 (Nov.	 13,	 2014,	 11:56	 AM),	
http://rhrealitycheck.org/article/201	
4/11/13/shoddy-evidence-finds-way-state-legislatures-u-s-supreme-court/.		
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dilation	 and	 extraction	procedures	without	 any	 explicit	 exception	 for	 emergency	
circumstances	which	require	the	procedure	in	the	interest	of	women’s	health.68	
The	change	in	standard	of	review	that	resulted	from	the	Casey	ruling,	from	
fundamental	 right	 deserving	 of	 strict	 scrutiny	 to	 an	 undue	 burden	 standard,	
remains	troublingly	unclear	and	has	been	applied	differently	by	state	and	federal	
courts.69	 Gonzales’	 application	 of	 the	 new	 Casey	 standard	 to	 the	 interests	
articulated	 in	 Roe	 opened	 the	 door	 for	 legislatures	 to	 craft	 laws	 regulating	
pregnant	women	under	the	guise	of	protecting	women’s	health.		
	
	
	
II.	 THE	 LEGISLATIVE	 TREND	 OF	 UNSCRUPULOUS	 USE	 OF	 SCIENCE	 IN	
CRAFTING	REPRODUCTIVE	HEALTH	REGULATIONS	
	
“There	is	no	crueler	tyranny	than	that	which	is	perpetuated	under	the	shield	of	law	
and	in	the	name	of	justice.”	–	Charles	de	Montesquieu		
	
The	 evolving	 framework	 and	 standard	 set	 by	 Roe	 and	 Casey	 opened	 the	
door	 for	 legislatures	 to	 craft	 morality	 laws	 and	 claim	 a	 valid	medical	 basis	 and	
interest	in	the	protection	of	women’s	health	and	fetal	health.70	The	propagation	of	
bad	or	questionable	science	and	debunked	theories	by	politicians	and	advocates	is	
referred	 to	 as	 the	 use	 of	 “junk	 science.”71	 This	 Part	 will	 profile	 the	 four	 broad	
categories	 of	 abortion	 laws	 passed	 by	 legislatures,	 the	 specific	 forms	 these	 laws	
take	and	the	purported	scientific	bases	for	them,	and	the	criticisms	leveled	at	such	
laws	by	the	medical	and	legal	communities.	
	
	
A.	 Evidence	of	a	Trend	
A	startling	trend	has	emerged	in	state	legislatures	since	the	Supreme	Court	
ruled	 on	 Gonzales	 v.	 Carhart	 in	 2007.	 The	 Gonzales	 decision	 signaled	 to	 anti-
																																																												
68		 See	 generally	 The	 Undue	 Burden	 Standard:	 Abortion	 Jurisprudence	 After	 Casey,	 CTR.	 FOR	
REPROD.	 RTS.	 (Mar.	 22,	 2013),	 http://reproductiverights.org/en/document/the-undue-burden-
module-updated-spring-2013	 (compiling	 several	 academic	 articles	 describing	 the	 confusion	 with	
the	current	state	of	abortion	law).	
69		 See	 Jeffrey	 Toobin,	The	Disappearing	 “Undue	 Burden”	 Standard	 for	 Abortion	 Rights,	 NEW	
YORKER	 (Sept.	 16,	 2014),	 http://www.newyorker.com/news/daily-comment/disappearing-undue-
burden-standard-abortion-rights.	
70		 See	 Ed	 Kilgore,	 The	 Inevitable	 SCOTUS	 Review	 of	 State	 Abortion	 Laws,	 WASHINGTON	
MONTHLY	 (July	 10,	 2013	 3:11	 PM),	 http://www.washingtonmonthly.com/political-animal-
a/2013_07/the_inevitable_scotus_review_o045750.php.	
71		 Lisa	M.	 Corrigan,	Navigating	 the	 Junk	 Science	 of	 Fetal	 Pain,	 SCIENCE	 PROGRESS	 (Apr.	 29,	
2013),	 http://scienceprogress.org/2013/04/navigating-the-junk-science-of-fetal-pain/;	 see	 also	
Jessica	Mason	Pieklo,	Excuse	Me?	There’s	No	‘Unsettled	Science’	in	the	Contraception	Challenges,	RH	
REALITY	CHECK	 (Mar.	 12,	 2014	4:14	PM),	http://rhrealitycheck.org/article/2014/03/12/excuse-theres-
unsettled-science-contraception-challenges/.	
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choice	 activists	 and	 legislators	 that	 abortion	 and	 other	 reproductive	 health	
regulations	would	receive	significantly	less	scrutiny	under	the	new	Roberts	Court’s	
application	of	 the	undue	burden	standard.72	As	a	result,	 since	Republicans	swept	
into	 state	 legislatures	 in	 2010,	 a	 staggering	 number	 of	 regulations	 targeting	
pregnant	women	and	choice	have	been	proposed	and	passed	in	the	states.73	These	
restrictions	 are	 smarter74	 and	 stealthier	 in	 effectively	 diminishing	 access	 to	
abortion	 services,	 typically	 claiming	 the	 protection	 of	 women’s	 health	 or	 fetal	
health	 as	 the	 basis	 for	 the	 imposition	 of	 extensive	 restrictions	 on	 women	 and	
providers.75	 The	 difficulty	 of	 challenging	 these	 restrictions	 in	 the	 courts	 has	
emboldened	 state	 legislatures	 to	 enact	 more	 regulations	 between	 2011	 and	 2013	
than	 in	 the	 entire	 previous	 decade.	 Astonishingly,	 300	 bills	 were	 introduced	 in	
state	legislatures	in	2012	alone,76	and	the	trend	seems	poised	to	continue.77	
	
	
B.		 Types	of	Laws	Regulating	Reproductive	Health	
Reproductive	health	care	 restrictions	 take	multiple	 forms78—ranging	 from	
mandatory	 delays	 to	 outright	 bans—and	 regulate	 everyone	 from	 health	 care	
providers,	to	women	seeking	abortions,	and	even	encompass	women	who	want	to	
carry	 their	 pregnancies	 to	 term.	 These	 restrictions	 result	 in	 decreased	 access	 to	
reproductive	health	care	that	has	left	women,	families,	and	health	care	providers	in	
the	crosshairs.		
	
	
																																																												
72		 See	Symposium,	After	Gonzales	v.	Carhart:	The	Future	of	Abortion	Jurisprudence,	PEW	RES.	
CTR.	(June	14,	2007),	http://www.pewforum.org/2007/06/14/after-gonzales-v-carhart-the-future-of-
abortion-jurisprudence/.	
73		 See	 State	 Policies	 in	 Brief:	 An	 Overview	 of	 Abortion	 Laws,	 GUTTMACHER	 INST.,	
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75		 E.g.,	 Beth	 Jordan	 &	 Elisa	 S.	 Wells,	 A	 21st-Century	 Trojan	 Horse:	 The	 “Abortion	 Harms	
Women”	Anti-Choice	Argument	Disguises	a	Harmful	Movement,	79	CONTRACEPTION	161	(2009).	
76		 Von	Diaz,	TRAP	Laws	are	the	New	Battleground	for	Abortion	Rights,	COLORLINES.COM	(Nov.	
5,	 2013	 6:14	 PM),	
http://colorlines.com/archives/2013/11/trap_laws_are_the_new_battleground_for_a	
bortion_rights.html;	 Hannah	 Groch-Begley,	 5	 Facts	 Media	 Should	 Know	 About	 States’	
Unprecedented	 Restrictions	 on	 Abortion,	 MEDIA	 MATTERS	 FOR	 AM.	 (July	 5,	 2013,	 10:52	 AM),	
http://mediamatters.org/re	
search/2013/07/05/5-facts-media-should-know-about-states-unpreced/194730.	
77		 See	Monthly	 States	 Update:	 Major	 Developments	 in	 2014,	 GUTTMACHER	 INST.	 (Dec.	 2014),	
http://www.guttmacher.org/statecenter/updates/december.html.	
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i. Targeted	Regulation	of	Abortion	Providers	(TRAP)	
One	of	the	most	successful	forms	of	these	new	regulations	are	TRAP	laws—
laws	that	impose	restrictions	on	providers	and	on	clinics	as	physical	spaces.	These	
laws	 create	 “requirements	 that	 are	 different	 and	 more	 burdensome	 than	 those	
imposed	 on	 other	 medical	 practices.”79	 They	 are	 enacted	 “under	 the	 guise	 of	
protecting	women’s	health,”80	on	 the	 implied	and	 faulty	premise	 that	abortion	 is	
an	inherently	dangerous	procedure.	In	reality,	abortion	is	one	of	the	safest	surgical	
procedures	 in	 the	 United	 States	 and	 is	 fourteen	 times	 safer	 than	 childbirth.81	
Reproductive	 rights	 groups	 and	 progressive	 news	 outlets	 (joined	 in	 their	
opposition	 to	 these	 laws	 by	 leading	 groups	 of	 medical	 professionals82)	 have	
documented	the	proliferation	and	impact	of	these	onerous	restrictions.	Pro-choice	
organizations,	with	the	support	of	leading	groups	of	medical	professionals	such	as	
the	American	Medical	Association	(AMA)	and	American	Congress	of	Obstetricians	
and	Gynecologists	(ACOG),83	have	challenged	these	restrictions	in	court	claiming	
that	such	excessive	regulations	are	representative	of	abortion	exceptionalism	and	
are	medically	unnecessary	when	abortion	is	actually	a	very	safe	procedure—84	safer	
even	than	colonoscopies85	and	penicillin	shots!86	
																																																												
79		 Targeted	Regulation	of	Abortion	Providers	 (TRAP),	CTR.	 FOR	REPROD.	RTS.	 (Aug.	 28,	 2015),	
http://reproductiverights.org/en/project/targeted-regulation-of-abortion-providers-trap.	
80		 Rachel	Benson	Gold	&	Elizabeth	Nash,	TRAP	Laws	Gain	Political	Traction	While	Abortion	
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of	Obstetrics	 and	 Gynecology	 with	 both	 sharing	 administrative	 teams.	 As	 such,	 throughout	 this	
Note,	the	former	title	will	be	used	to	identify	these	organizations.	
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http://plannedparenthoodaction.org/ele	
ctions-politics/blog/latest-tactic-restrict-safe-and-legal-abortion-admitting-privileges/;	 Tara	 Culp-
Ressler,	You’re	 40	 Times	More	 Likely	 To	Die	 From	A	Colonoscopy	 Than	 from	 an	Abortion,	 THINK	
PROGRESS	 (Aug.	 8,	 2014	 12:57	 PM),	 http://thinkprogress.org/health/2014/08/08/3469232/abortion-
safety-trap-laws/.	
86		 Emily	Bazelon,	Caught	in	a	TRAP,	SLATE	(May	26,	2014	11:45	PM),		
http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2014/05/alabama_abortion_law_ac
cess_to_abortion_through_the_entire_south_is_on_trial.html;	 Imani	 Gandy,	 Why	 Admitting	
Privileges	 Have	 No	 Benefit,	 RH	 REALITY	 CHECK	 (July	 24,	 2013	 3:30	 PM),	
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As	 of	 December	 2014,	 TRAP	 laws	 exist	 in	 twenty-six	 states,87	 imposing	 a	
variety	of	restrictions	with	which	it	is	difficult	to	comply.	For	those	providers	and	
clinics	 that	 manage	 compliance,	 additional	 administrative	 and	 renovation	 or	
relocation	expenses	drive	up	the	cost	of	abortion	services.88	Unfortunately,	this	is	
not	 the	 worst-case	 scenario.	 TRAP	 laws	 contributed	 to	 the	 closing	 of	 fifty-four	
clinics	from	2011	to	2013.89	Six	states,	as	of	December	2015,	were	down	to	one	public	
clinic	still	offering	abortions,90	forcing	state	residents	to	travel	far	out	of	their	way	
in	order	to	access	reproductive	health	services.	These	laws	also	have	the	potential	
deleterious	effect	of	deterring	would-be	providers	due	to	fear	of	criminal	and	civil	
liability,	 burdensome	 administrative	 requirements,	 and	 hostile	 practice	
environments.91		
Although	it	has	traditionally	been	difficult	to	challenge	these	regulations	in	
court,92	a	recent	ruling	by	a	Wisconsin	federal	judge	provides	reason	for	hope	and	
an	example	of	proper	 judicial	 treatment	of	 such	 restrictions.	The	opinion,	which	
struck	 down	 a	 law	 involving	 a	 number	 of	 TRAP	 law	 provisions,	 held	 that	 the	
restrictions	 impose	 a	 substantial	 obstacle	 and	 do	 not	 even	 bear	 a	 rational	
relationship	to	the	State’s	expressed	interest,	as	 illustrated	by	the	State’s	 inaction	
in	otherwise	regulating	similar	medical	procedures.93	
Among	the	 laws	that	regulate	physical	clinic	 facilities	are	 facility-licensing	
requirements	 necessitating	 that	 clinics	 obtain	 state	 licensing	 (a	 restriction	 not	
imposed	 on	 other	 comparable	 offices	 or	 clinics)	 and	 require	 that	 clinics	 meet	
standards	 relating	 to	 physical	 construction,	 staffing,	 and	 procedures.94	 At	 times,	
these	 licensing	 schemes	 necessitate	 that	 clinics	 providing	 surgical	 abortions	 be	
																																																												
87		 Heather	 D.	 Boonstra	 &	 Elizabeth	 Nash,	 A	 Surge	 of	 State	 Abortion	 Restrictions	 Puts	
Providers—and	the	Women	They	Serve—in	the	Crosshairs,	GUTTMACHER	POL’Y	REV.,	Winter	2014,	at	
9,	10.	
88		 Dawn	 Johnsen,	 “TRAP”ing	 Roe	 in	 Indiana	 and	 a	 Common-Ground	 Alternative,	 118	Yale	
L.J.	1356,	1362	(2009);	cf.	Diaz,	supra	note	75.	
89		 Laura	 Bassett,	Anti-Abortion	 Laws	 Take	Dramatic	 Toll	 on	 Clinics	Nationwide,	Huffington	
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http://thinkprogress.org/health/2013/06/10/2129831/doctors-group-anti-abortion-political-agenda/	
(noting	shortage	of	women’s	health	care	providers	in	states	with	restrictions);	Targeted	Regulation	
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AM.	(Jan.	1,	2015),	http://www.prochoiceamerica.org/media/fact-sheets/abortion-access-trap.pdf.	
92		 The	GOP	Takes	Its	War	on	Women	to	the	States,	supra	note	77.	
93		 See	Planned	Parenthood	of	Wisconsin	v.	Van	Hollen,	963	F.	Supp.	2d	858,	866	(2013).		
94		 Targeted	Regulation	of	Abortion	Providers	(TRAP),	supra	note	78.	
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licensed	as	 ambulatory	 surgical	 centers	 (ASCs),	 a	designation	otherwise	 reserved	
for	facilities	that	offer	a	range	of	(typically	riskier95)	outpatient	surgeries.96	In	order	
to	 obtain	 licensing,	 clinics	 are	 required	 to	meet	 various	 standards.	Among	 these	
standards	 are	 specified	 sizes	 of	 procedure	 rooms,	 minimum	 corridor	 widths,	
maximum	 set	 distances	 from	 a	 hospital,	 and	 transfer	 agreements	 with	 local	
hospitals.97	 In	 addition	 to	 these	 regulations,	 certain	 states	 require	 that	 abortions	
be	performed	 in	a	hospital	after	 the	 fetus	has	reached	a	specified	gestational	age	
(typically	at	a	point	during	the	second	trimester).98	These	restrictions	encroach	on	
clinics	by	requiring	burdensome	reporting	requirements	and	licensing	agreements	
that	permit	state	inspection	at	any	time,99	a	feature	of	unnecessary	oversight	that	
can	 significantly	 interfere	 with	 the	 quality	 of	 care	 and	 the	 privacy	 and	
confidentiality	of	the	physician-patient	relationship.100	
In	 addition	 to	 regulations	 governing	 clinics,	 TRAP	 laws	 also	 impose	
unnecessary	 and	burdensome	 requirements	 on	 the	 abortion	providers,	 intruding	
significantly	 into	 providers’	 ability	 to	 practice	 medicine	 and	 effectively	
discouraging	 health	 care	 professionals	 from	 becoming	 or	 remaining	 abortion	
providers.101	Restrictions	on	providers	take	various	 forms.	 In	thirteen	states,	as	of	
December	 2014,	 abortion	 providers	 are	 required	 to	 have	 some	 affiliation	 with	 a	
local	hospital,	with	four	states	requiring	that	providers	have	hospital	privileges	and	
nine	permitting	an	alternative	agreement.102	Thirty-nine	states	require	medication	
abortions	 to	be	performed	by	a	 licensed	physician,	with	eleven	 states	 “bann[ing]	
the	use	of	telemedicine	.	.	.	by	requiring	the	physician	to	be	present”	in	the	room.103	
Four	states	require	that	medication	providers	follow	outdated	FDA	protocols	from	
2000.104	 Additionally,	 thirty-nine	 states	 require	 abortions	 be	 performed	 by	 a	
physician	and	eighteen	states	“require	the	involvement	of	a	second	physician	after	
a	specified	point	in	the	pregnancy.”105		
As	 legal	 and	 medical	 experts	 have	 argued,	 there	 is	 no	 basis	 to	 require	
admitting	privileges	or	transfer	agreements	in	the	case	of	an	emergency	when	local	
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Aug.	1,	2015).	
97		 State	Policies	in	Brief:	Targeted	Regulation	of	Abortion	Providers,	supra	note	95.	
98		 State	Laws	Regulating	Reproductive	Rights,	supra	note	21.	
99		 Targeted	 Regulation	 of	 Abortion	 Providers:	 Avoiding	 the	 “TRAP”,	 CTR.	 FOR	 REPROD.	 RTS.	 2	
(Aug.	2003),	http://reproductiverights.org/sites/crr.civicactions.net/files/documents/pub_bp_avoid	
ingthetrap.pdf.	
100		 See	 Carole	 Joffe,	The	 Hidden	 Costs	 of	 Abortion	 Restrictions,	 RH	 REALITY	 CHECK	 (Oct.	 15,	
2014,	12:57	PM),	http://rhrealitycheck.org/article/2014/10/15/hidden-costs-abortion-restrictions/.	
101		 See	Targeted	Regulation	of	Abortion	Providers:	Avoiding	the	“TRAP”,	supra	note	98,	at	1.	
102		 State	Policies	in	Brief:	Targeted	Regulation	of	Abortion	Providers,	supra	note	95.	
103		 State	Laws	Regulating	Reproductive	Rights,	supra	note	21.	
104		 Id.	
105		 Id.	
Indiana	Journal	of	Law	and	Social	Equality	 Vol.	4,	Issue	1	
	
	37	
emergency	 rooms	 are	 already	 required	 to	 take	 patients	 in	 dire	 medical	
conditions.106	 It	 is	 also	 an	 uncharacteristic	 regulation	 of	 the	 medical	 and	
pharmaceutical	professions	to	require	providers	and	prescribers	to	follow	outdated	
protocols	 when	 new	 uses	 and	 dosages	 for	 drugs	 are	 prescribed	 and	 updated	
throughout	the	profession	with	great	regularity.107		
	
	
ii. Laws	Criminalizing	Substance	Abuse	by	Pregnant	Women	
A	 recent	 report,	 co-authored	 by	 Lynn	 Paltrow	 and	 Jeanette	 Flavin,	
documented	hundreds	of	incidents	of	arrests	of	pregnant	women.108	This	troubling	
trend	stayed	largely	out	of	the	public	eye109	until	the	publication	of	the	report.	The	
subsequent	media	coverage110	was	followed	by	messaging	campaigns	over	the	next	
few	years.	
Most	of	these	cases	have	arisen	through	clever	prosecutorial	charges	out	of	
the	enforcement	of	statutes	not	originally	designed	to	apply	to	pregnant	women.111	
However,	 attempts	 to	 pass	 personhood	 legislation	 in	 various	 states—that	 is,	
constitutional	amendments	that	recognize	the	life	of	a	fetus	as	a	person	under	the	
law	 with	 the	 intended	 effect	 of	 holding	 anyone	 (including	 mothers)	 criminally	
liable	 for	 harm	 to	 the	 fetus—would	 enshrine	 these	 despicable	 prosecutorial	
maneuvers	 in	 the	 law	 once	 and	 for	 all.112	 Fortunately,	 these	 bills	 have	 been	
unsuccessful	thus	far,113	but	they	certainly	represent	a	sign	of	additional	legislation	
that	is	sure	to	come.	
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(Nov.	7,	2014),	http://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/08/opinion/pregnant-and-no-civil-rights.html.	
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Women,	GUTTMACHER	POL’Y	REV.,	Dec.	2000,	at	3.	
112		 See	Lynn	M.	Paltrow,	Roe	v.	Wade	and	the	New	Jane	Crow:	Reproductive	Rights	in	the	Age	of	
Mass	Incarceration,	103	AM.	J.	PUB.	HEALTH	17	(2013).	
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HUFFINGTON	POST	(Nov.	5,	2014,	8:59	AM),	http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/11/04/personhood-
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Recently,	 Tennessee	 earned	 the	 unenviable	 distinction	 of	 being	 the	 first	
state	 to	 pass	 a	 bill	 criminalizing	 drug	 use	 by	 pregnant	women.114	 Representative	
and	specialty	medical	associations,	including	the	American	Academy	of	Pediatrics,	
the	American	Public	Health	Association,	 the	AMA,	and	the	ACOG,	among	many	
others,	 opposed	 this	with	 near	 uniformity	 and	 for	 a	 variety	 of	 reasons.115	 In	 July	
2014,	Mallory	Loyola	was	the	first	woman	arrested	under	the	new	law.116		
The	 Tennessee	 law,	 passed	 in	 April	 2014,	 is	 likely	 rooted	 in	 the	 hysteria	
surrounding	the	myth	of	“crack	babies.”	The	term	“crack	babies”	refers	to	infants	
who	are	born	 suffering	 from	drug	dependency	 as	 a	 result	 of	 the	mother’s	use	of	
those	 drugs	 during	 pregnancy.	 In	 the	 1980s	 and	 1990s,	 when	 drug	 use	 and	
increased	 policing	 and	 criminalization	 of	 drug	 users	 grew	 exponentially,	 news	
outlets	printed	news	pieces	documenting	a	troubling	phenomenon	of	babies	who	
were	being	born	with	symptoms	of	addiction.117	Unfortunately,	these	reports	were	
circulated	before	the	long-term	effects	of	the	drugs	on	the	babies	had	been	studied	
and	 measured.	 As	 it	 turned	 out,	 there	 were	 no	 significant	 long-term	 effects	
causally	 connected	 to	 the	 ingestion	 of	 drugs	 by	 the	 fetus	 while	 in	 utero.118	 A	
decades-long	 study	 debunking	 the	 myth	 of	 the	 crack	 baby	 has	 since	 been	
published,	with	 high	 profile	 news	 outlets	 reporting	 on	 the	 new	 state	 of	medical	
knowledge	in	this	area.119	Regrettably,	the	misinformation	persists.120	
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Although	 Tennessee	 is	 the	 first	 state	 to	 impose	 criminal	 punishment	 for	
women	convicted	of	using	drugs	while	pregnant,	eighteen	other	states	characterize	
drug	use	during	pregnancy	as	a	 form	of	child	abuse	under	child	welfare	statutes,	
enabling	that	information	to	be	used	in	state	custody	proceedings,	and	three	states	
allow	 for	 the	 civil	 commitment	 of	 pregnant	women	who	 are	 discovered	 to	 have	
used	illicit	substances	during	pregnancy.121		
These	laws	harm	women	and	the	fetuses	that	they	seek	to	carry	to	term.	In	
policy	 statements	 and	 amicus	 curiae,	 opposition	 by	 several	 medical	 groups	 and	
associations	characterizes	 the	 laws	as	detrimental	 for	several	 reasons.122	First	and	
foremost,	 the	 laws	 interfere	 with	 addiction	 treatment	 programs	 that	 utilize	
methadone	 or	 other	 controlled	 substances	 to	 wean	 addicted	 mothers	 off	
potentially	 more	 harmful	 drugs.123	 Additionally,	 the	 laws	 create	 a	 conflict	 of	
interest	for	the	doctor,	who	is	forced	into	a	choice	between	whether	to	prioritize	
the	 treatment	 of	 the	 woman	 as	 patient	 or	 the	 fetus.124	 This	 potentially	 deters	
women	 from	 seeking	 addiction	 therapies,	 prompting	women	 to	 take	 one	 of	 two	
alternative	 and	 inferior	 routes:	 attempt	 to	 self-help	 and	 experience	 withdrawal	
symptoms	that	could	cause	worse	harm	to	the	fetus,	or	continue	the	use	of	drugs	
and	drug-seeking	behaviors	that	are	likely	detrimental	to	the	health	of	the	mother	
and	 the	 fetus.125	 The	 laws	 also	 disrupt	 the	 trust	 that	 is	 integral	 to	 a	 healthy	
physician-patient	 relationship126	 and	 heap	 unfair	 suspicion	 on	 any	 woman	 who	
miscarries	 or	 experiences	 a	 stillbirth.	 Furthermore,	 the	 prevailing	 consensus	
among	medical	groups	is	that	certain	aspects	of	incarceration	can	be	dangerous	for	
pregnant	women.127	
																																																																																																																																																																																	
scenes/journal-retracts-flawed-study-linking-mmr-vaccine-and-autism	 (explaining	 that	 the	 sole	
study	linking	vaccines	with	autism	has	since	been	retracted),	with	Immunization:	MMR	Vaccine	&	
Autism,	 AM.	 ACAD.	 PEDIATRICS,	 http://www2.aap.org/immunization/families/mmr.html	 (last	
updated	Apr.	29,	2014)	(warning	that	the	MMR	vaccine	has	been	linked	to	autism).		
121		 See	 Pregnant,	 Drug-Using	 Women,	 &	 State	 Child	 Welfare	 Policies,	 NAT’L	 ADVOC.	 FOR	
PREGNANT	WOMEN	(Mar.	21,	2014),	http://advocatesforpregnantwomen.org/issues/in_the_states/pre	
gnant_drugusing_women_state_child_welfare_policies.php.	
122		 E.g.,	 Brief	 for	 the	 Southern	 Poverty	 Law	 Center	 et	 al.	 as	 Amicus	 Curiae	 Supporting	
Petitioner,	 In	 re	 State	 of	Alabama	 v.	Amanda	Helaine	Kimbrough,	No.	 11-10219,	 at	 2–3	 (Ala.	Mar.	
2012).	
123		 Women	 who	 are	 already	 enrolled	 in	 treatment	 have	 an	 affirmative	 defense	 to	 the	 law	
however.	 Tennessee	 Pregnancy	 Criminalization	 Law	 (SB	 1391),	 RH	 REALITY	 CHECK,	
http://data.rhrealitycheck.org/law/tennessee-pregnancy-criminalization-law-sb-1391/	 (last	 updated	
Oct.	1,	2014).	
124		 See	Kylie	Alexandra,	The	Criminalization	of	Pregnant	Women	and	the	Illusion	of	Maternal-
Fetal	Conflict,	8	HOHONU	39,	41	(2010).	
125		 Lauren	Kirchner,	The	Dangers	of	Criminalizing	Pregnancy	Outcomes,	PAC.	STANDARD	(May	
13,	 2014),	 http://www.psmag.com/navigation/politics-and-law/dangers-criminalizing-pregnancy-
outcomes-81289/.	
126		 Culp-Ressler,	 supra	 note	 90	 (noting	 shortage	 of	 women’s	 health	 care	 providers	 in	 states	
with	restrictions).	
127		 See	Audrey	Quinn,	Opinion,	In	Labor,	in	Chains,	N.Y.	TIMES	(July	26,	2014),	http://www.nyti	
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iii. Fetal	Pain	Abortion	Bans	
Even	though	only	12.5%	of	women	obtain	abortions	after	the	twelfth	week	
and	 only	 1.5%	 of	 women	 obtain	 abortions	 after	 twenty	 weeks,128	 a	 surge	 in	 new	
kinds	 of	 restrictions	 has	 occurred	 since	 2010	when	Nebraska	 passed	 an	 abortion	
ban	at	twenty	weeks	on	the	basis	of	the	ability	of	the	fetus	to	feel	pain	at	this	point	
in	gestation.129	The	law	mirrored	model	legislation	crafted	by	the	National	Right	to	
Life	 Committee.130	 As	 of	 2015,	 nineteen	 states	 had	 enacted	 pre-viability	 abortion	
bans;	nine	of	these	states	have	done	so	on	the	premise	that	the	fetus	has	developed	
the	necessary	biological	structures	to	experience	pain.131	Citing	these	neurological	
pathways	 and	 the	 use	 of	 fetal	 sedation	 procedures	 for	 later-term	 abortions,	
legislators	 in	these	nine	states	claim	fetal	pain	as	the	medical	and	scientific	basis	
for	the	bills.132	Yet,	even	certain	religious	advocates	who	oppose	abortion	recognize	
the	unstable	footing	of	the	laws.133	
Although	 Casey	 permits	 regulations	 that	 serve	 the	 State’s	 interest	 in	
protecting	 potential	 life	 so	 long	 as	 they	 do	 not	 have	 the	 purpose	 or	 effect	 of	
imposing	 an	 undue	 burden	 on	 women’s	 protected	 liberty	 interest	 in	 obtaining	
abortions,134	the	framework	of	Roe	is	still	good	law	that	forbids	any	complete	bans	
on	abortions	pre-viability.135	Since	viability	is	a	characteristic	that	varies	depending	
on	 a	 number	 of	 factors	 (including	 sex	 and	 birth	 weight),136	 and	most	 measures	
																																																																																																																																																																																	
mes.com/2014/07/27/opinion/sunday/the-outrageous-shackling-of-pregnant-inmates.html;	 Health	
Care	 for	 Pregnant	 and	 Postpartum	 Incarcerated	 Women	 and	 Adolescent	 Females,	 AM.	 CONG.	
OBSTETRICIANS	 &	 GYNECOLOGISTS	 3	 (Nov.	 2011),	 http://www.acog.org/-/media/Committee-
Opinions/Committee-on-Health-Care-for-Underserved-Women/co511.pdf;	 Briefing	 Paper,	 Am.	
Civil	Liberties	Union,	The	Shackling	of	Pregnant	Women	and	Girls	in	U.S.	Prisons,	Jails,	and	Youth	
Detention	Centers	(Oct.	12,	2012),	https://www.aclu.org/files/assets/anti-shackling_briefing_paper_s	
tand_alone.pdf.	
128		 Eric	 Eckholm,	 Several	 States	 Forbid	 Abortion	 After	 20	Weeks,	 N.Y.	 TIMES	 (June	 26,	 2011),	
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/27/us/27abortion.html.	
129		 Abortion	Bans	at	20	Weeks:	A	Dangerous	Restriction	for	Women,	NARAL	PRO-CHOICE	AM.	1	
(Jan.	1,	2014),	http://www.prochoiceamerica.org/media/fact-sheets/abortion-bans-at-20-weeks.pdf.	
130		 See	Pema	Levy,	Can	the	Myth	of	Fetal	Pain	Topple	Roe	v.	Wade,	NEWSWEEK	(Nov.	11,	2013,	
3:53	PM),	http://www.newsweek.com/can-myth-fetal-pain-topple-roe-v-wade-3077.	
131		 See	 State	 Policies	 in	 Brief:	 State	 Policies	 on	 Later	 Abortions,	 GUTTMACHER	 INST.,	
http://guttma	
cher.org/statecenter/spibs/spib_PLTA.pdf	(last	updated	Oct.	1,	2015).	
132		 A	History	of	Key	Abortion	Rulings	of	the	U.S.	Supreme	Court:	Fetal	Pain	Laws,	PEW	RES.	CTR	
(Jan.	 16,	 2013),	 http://www.pewforum.org/2013/01/16/a-history-of-key-abortion-rulings-of-the-us-
supreme-court/#fetal.	
133		 See	Katelyn	Beaty,	Editorial,	The	Problem	with	the	Fetal	Pain	Abortion	Bans,	CHRISTIANITY	
TODAY	 (Jan.	 8,	 2014),	 http://www.christianitytoday.com/ct/2014/january-february/problem-with-
fetal-pain-abortion-bans.html.	
134		 See	 I.	 Glenn	 Cohen,	Opinion,	The	 Flawed	 Basis	 Behind	 Fetal-Pain	 Abortion	 Laws,	WASH.	
POST	(Aug.	1,	2012),	http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/the-flawed-basis-behind-fetal-pain-
abortion-laws/2012/08/01/gJQAS0w8PX_story.html.	
135		 See,	e.g.,	State	Laws	Regulating	Reproductive	Rights,	supra	note	21.	
136		 I.	Glenn	Cohen	&	Sadath	Sayeed,	Fetal	Pain,	Abortion,	Viability,	and	the	Constitution,	39	J.L.	
MED.	 &	 ETHICS	 235,	 236	 (2011);	 Lisa	 M.	 Corrigan,	 Fetal	 Anomalies,	 Undue	 Burdens,	 and	 20-Week	
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indicate	(and	medical	experts	assert)	that	the	likelihood	of	viability	before	twenty-
four	weeks	is	significantly	diminished,	the	bans	are	likely	unconstitutional	without	
a	 valid	 scientific	 basis	 that	 demonstrates	 the	 necessity	 of	 the	 regulation	 in	
protecting	the	health	of	the	woman	or	fetus.137	
Comprehensive	studies	and	an	exhaustive	review	of	such	studies	published	
in	the	Journal	of	the	American	Medical	Association	in	2005	established	that	fetuses	
do	 not	 feel	 pain	 at	 twenty	 weeks.138	 Although	 the	 neural	 circuitry	 required	 for	
experiencing	 pain	 begins	 to	 develop	 at	 around	 twenty-three	 weeks	 of	 gestation,	
“the	pathways	are	not	 functional	and	cannot	 transmit	 the	noxious	 stimuli	 to	 the	
brain	before	29	or	30	weeks.”139	The	science	has	not	changed	in	the	past	decade.140	
Experts	 explain	 that	 the	 fetus	 is	 suspended	 in	 a	 continuous	 sleep/coma-like	
unconscious	 sedation	 through	 the	 end	 of	 the	 second	 trimester.141	 Furthermore,	
although	 supporters	 of	 these	 bans	 point	 to	 automatic,	 reflexive	 responses	 of	
fetuses	 that	 occur	 in	 reaction	 to	 an	 amniocentesis	 needle	 or	 other	 stimulation,	
these	reflexes	are	not	indicators	of	pain	or	of	a	conscious	experience	of	pain.142	The	
use	of	anesthesia	by	providers	of	second-trimester	abortions	serves	the	purpose	of	
sedating	the	fetus	so	that	it	moves	less,	with	an	additional	effect	of	mitigating	any	
																																																																																																																																																																																	
Abortion	 Bans,	 SCI.	 PROGRESS	 (May	 23,	 2013),	 http://scienceprogress.org/2013/05/fetal-anomalies-
undue-burdens-and-20-week-abortion-bans/.	
137		 See,	 e.g.,	 Bernice	 Bird,	 Fetal	 Personhood	 Laws	 as	 Limits	 to	 Maternal	 Personhood	 at	 Any	
Stage	of	Pregnancy:	Balancing	Fetal	and	Maternal	Interests	at	Post-Viability	Among	Fetal	Pain	and	
Fetal	 Homicide	 Laws,	 25	 HASTINGS	 WOMEN’S	 L.J.	 39,	 41	 (2014);	 Countering	 Misinformation:	 A	
Discussion	 of	 “Viability”,	 ANSIRH,	 http://ansirh.org/research/late-abortion/countering-
misinformation/viability.	
php	[https://web.archive.org/web/20150916182333/http://www.ansirh.org/research/late-abortion/co	
untering-misinformation/viability.php].		
138		 Susan	 J.	 Lee,	 Henry	 J.	 Peter	 Ralston,	 Eleanor	 A.	 Drey,	 John	 Colin.	 Partridge,	 &	Mark	 A.	
Rosen,	Fetal	Pain:	A	Systematic	Multidisciplinary	Review	of	the	Evidence,	294	J.	AM.	MED.	ASS’N.	947	
(2005).	
139		 Corrigan,	supra	note	70.	
140		 Liz	Halloran	&	Julie	Rovner,	High	Court’s	Pass	on	‘Fetal	Pain’	Abortion	Case	Unlikely	to	Cool	
Debate,	 NPR	 (Jan.	 13,	 2014,	 4:40	 PM),	
http://www.npr.org/blogs/itsallpolitics/2014/01/13/262178284/h	
igh-court-wont-hear-fetal-pain-abortion-case-as-debate-rages.	
141		 Ian	Vandewalker,	Abortion	 and	 Informed	Consent:	How	Biased	Counseling	 Laws	Mandate	
Violations	of	Medical	Ethics,	19	MICH.	J.	GENDER	&	L.	1,	23	(2012);	Michelle	Goldberg,	The	Uncertain	
Science	 of	 Fetal	 Pain,	 DAILY	 BEAST	 (June	 19,	 2013,	 4:45	 AM),	
http://www.thedailybeast.com/witw/articl	
es/2013/06/19/the-uncertain-science-of-fetal-pain.html.		
142		 John	 A.	 Robertson,	 Fetal	 Pain	 Laws:	 Scientific	 and	 Constitutional	 Controversy,	 HARV.	 L.	
SCH.:	 BILL	 OF	 HEALTH	 (June	 26,	 2013),	 http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/billofhealth/2013/06/26/fetal-
pain-laws-scientific-and-constitutional-controversy/.	
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painful	sensory	experiences	that	may	exist.143	As	a	result	of	the	scientific	consensus	
on	the	subject,	these	laws	are	opposed	by	the	ACOG.144	
Regardless	 of	 the	 date	 of	 publication	 and	 the	 scientific	 consensus	 on	 the	
matter,	proponents	of	these	bans	do	not	hesitate	to	use	quotations	excerpted	from	
researchers	who	study	pain	and	fetal	development	to	the	dismay	and	astonishment	
of	those	very	researchers.145	Unfortunately	since	there	are	still	one	or	two	“medical	
experts”	who	are	willing	 to	 testify	before	 legislatures	and	courts,146	 an	 illusion	of	
scientific	uncertainty	could	be	interpreted	to	exist.147	
Federal	judges	have	struck	down	these	fetal	pain	abortion	bans	in	Idaho148	
and	Arizona;149	 similarly,	a	Georgia	state	court	enjoined	the	State	 from	enforcing	
such	 a	 ban.150	 A	 district	 court	 judge	 in	 Idaho	 similarly	 struck	 down	 such	 a	
provision,	determining	 that	 it	 constituted	a	 substantial	 obstacle	 and	 imposed	an	
undue	 burden	 on	 women	 seeking	 abortions.151	 A	 Ninth	 Circuit	 panel	 of	 judges	
permanently	 struck	 down	 the	Arizona	 law	 on	 the	 grounds	 that	 any	 pre-viability	
bans	 were	 unconstitutional	 under	 Roe	 v.	 Wade.152	 None	 of	 the	 three	 opinions	
utilized	 rational	 basis	 review	 to	 strike	 down	 the	 law	 in	 question,	 declining	 the	
opportunity	to	hold	that	the	law	had	no	real	effect	on	the	interest	and	purpose	of	
the	legislation	as	a	result	of	the	medical	claims	being	false	and	unsubstantiated.		
																																																												
143		 Pam	Belluck,	Complex	Science	at	Issue	in	Politics	of	Fetal	Pain,	N.Y.	TIMES	(Sept.	16,	2013),	
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/17/health/complex-science-at-issue-in-politics-of-fetal-pain.html;	
Cohen,	supra	note	133.	
144		 Statement,	 Am.	 Cong.	 Of	 Obstetricians	 &	 Gynecologists,	 ACOG	 Statement	 on	 HR	 3803	
(June	 18,	 2012),	
http://www.acog.org/~/media/Departments/Government%20Relations%20and%20Outre	
ach/20120618DCAborStmnt.pdf.	
145		 E.g.,	 Belluck,	 supra	 note	 142;	 Tara	 Culp-Ressler,	 Scientists	 Studying	 ‘Fetal	 Pain’	 Don’t	
Actually	Want	Their	Research	Used	 to	 Justify	Abortion	Bans,	THINK	PROGRESS	 (Sept.	 17,	 2013,	 11:46	
AM),	 http://thinkprogress.org/health/2013/09/17/2633271/scientists-fetal-pain/;	 Jill	 Filipovic,	 No,	
Science	 Doesn’t	 Back	 20-Week	 ‘Fetal	 Pain’	 Abortion	 Bans,	 TPM	 (Sept.	 20,	 2013,	 1:26	 PM),	
http://talkingpoints	
memo.com/cafe/science-doesn-t-back-fetal-pain-justification-for-20-week-abortion-bans.	
146		 Jodi	Jacobson,	Trent	Franks,	Abortion	Bans,	and	the	Fetal	Pain	Lie,	RH	REALITY	CHECK	(June	
13,	2013,	11:35	AM),	http://rhrealitycheck.org/article/2013/06/13/trent-franks-abortion-bans-and-the-
fetal-pain-lie/.	
147		 Coutts	&	Resnick,	supra	note	66.	
148		 McCormack	v.	Hiedeman,	900	F.	Supp.	2d	1128	(D.	Idaho	2013),	aff’d	sub	nom.	McCormack	
v.	Herzog,	788	F.3d	1017	(9th	Cir.	2015).	
149		 Isaacson	v.	Horne,	716	F.3d	1213,	1217	(9th	Cir.	2013).	
150		 Lathrop	 v.	 Deal,	 No.	 2012-cv-224423	 (Ga.	 Super.	 Ct.	 Dec.	 21,	 2012)	 (order	 granting	
interlocutory	 injunction).	 Currently	 the	 parties	 are	 waiting	 for	 argument	 to	 be	 scheduled	 on	 a	
motion	 for	 summary	 judgment.	 Recent	 Abortion	 Ban	 Litigation,	 CTR.	 FOR	 REPROD.	 RTS.,	
http://reproductiveri	
ghts.org/sites/crr.civicactions.net/files/documents/Previability-Litigation-With-Chart-for-Sept-20-
week-ban%20vote.pdf	(last	updated	Sept.	16,	2015).	
151		 McCormack,	900	F.	Supp.	2d	at	1150.		
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The	Supreme	Court	declined	the	opportunity	to	review	the	Ninth	Circuit’s	
ruling,	 leaving	 decisions	 in	 the	 hands	 of	 the	 federal	 courts,	 for	 now.153	
Unfortunately,	some	states	will	not	even	face	challenges	to	these	laws	since	those	
states	do	not	have	providers	who	conduct	abortions	in	the	second	trimester,	and	
constitutional	 litigation	 requires	 legal	 standing	and	a	 claim	of	harm	 to	 the	 filing	
party.154	 Supporters	 of	 these	 bans,	 however,	 continue	 to	 propose	 legislation	
modeled	 after	 the	 Pain-Capable	Unborn	 Children	 Act	 drafted	 by	 the	NRLC	 and	
passed	by	the	United	States	House	of	Representatives.155	Anti-choice	proponents	of	
these	measures	base	 their	hopes	on	 the	precedent	 set	by	Gonzales	 v.	Carhart,	 in	
which	the	Supreme	Court	upheld	a	federal	abortion	ban156	just	years	after	striking	
a	 similar	 state	 provision	 down157	 and	 after	 federal	 courts	 had	 acted	 similarly	 to	
strike	down	the	Partial	Birth	Abortion	Ban	Act	of	2003	in	the	years	between.158	A	
Supreme	 Court	 ruling	 upholding	 fetal	 pain	 abortion	 bans	 would	 overrule	 the	
framework	set	up	in	Roe.	
	 These	bills	are	not	only	problematic	because	they	are	based	on	junk	science	
but	also	because	eighteen-	to	twenty-week	gestational	age	is	the	time	period	when	
a	 range	 of	 fetal	 abnormalities	 can	 be	 detected	 for	 the	 first	 time.159	 Additional	
burdensome	 restrictions	 impeding	 speedy	 access	 to	 abortion	 services	 and	
imposing	 excessive	 stress	 and	 costs	 could	 create	 a	 situation	 where	 women	 find	
themselves	in	a	race	against	the	clock	to	obtain	an	abortion	before	running	into	a	
valid	constitutional	ban	beginning	at	twenty-four	weeks	or	soon	thereafter.	These	
laws	are	 troublesome	 for	additional	 reasons.160	They	 impact	women	who	wish	 to	
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http://	
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(July	 11,	 2013,	 5:06	 PM),	
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carry	their	children	to	term	but	experience	complications	in	pregnancy,161	and	they	
normalize	 false	 ideas	 and	 perpetuate	 misinformation.	 Doctors	 have	 reported	
having	conversations	with	patients	that	were	extremely	uncommon	a	decade	ago	
and	 attribute	 this	 change	 to	 increased	 misinformation	 among	 laypersons.162	
Furthermore,	 the	 framing	 of	 abortion	 procedures	 carried	 out	 after	 the	 twenty-
week	 mark	 primarily	 as	 an	 issue	 of	 fetal	 pain	 both	 changes	 the	 nature	 of	 the	
conversation	away	from	women’s	liberty	interests	and	also	likely	benefits	the	anti-
choice	 messaging	 tactics.	 These	 arguments	 typically	 achieve	 greater	 success	 in	
gaining	public	support	for	restrictions	on	abortions,	where	the	discussion	revolves	
around	fetuses	instead	of	embryos.163	
	
	
iv. Informed	Consent	Laws	
The	concept	of	 informed	consent	emerged	in	twentieth	century	tort	 law164	
and	was	 rooted	 in	 the	American	 principle	 of	 enabling	 and	promoting	 decisional	
autonomy.165	The	purpose	of	informed	consent	in	the	medical	context	is	for	health	
care	 providers	 to	 disclose—amongst	 other	 things—“the	 substantial	 risks	 and	
hazards	 inherent	 in	 the	 proposed…procedures.”166	 Though	 certain	 exceptions	 to	
informed	consent	 exist,	 including	patient	waiver	 and	emergency	 treatment,167	 an	
expectation	of	informed	consent	is	the	standard	imposed	by	the	law.168	In	modern	
law,	most	states	have	protected	this	expectation	statutorily,	imposing	civil	liability	
for	damages	on	doctors	who	fail	to	adhere	to	legal	requirements	and	professional	
standards.169	 Such	 statutes	 apply	 evenly	 to	 health	 care	 practitioners	 of	 any	
specialty,	 requiring	 them	 to	 disclose	 to	 the	 patient	 any	 risks	 associated	 with	
specific	 treatment	options.170	Moreover,	gross	neglect	 in	meeting	 these	standards	
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http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=128212951;	 Katie	McDonough,	Fetal	 Pain	 is	
a	 Lie:	 How	 Phony	 Science	 Took	 Over	 the	 Abortion	 Debate,	 POPULAR	 SCI.	 (Aug.	 7,	 2013),	
http://popsci.co	
m/science/article/2013-08/fetal-pain-lie-how-phony-science-took-over-abortion-debate.	
164		 Vandewalker,	supra	note	140,	at	4.		
165		 Rachel	 Benson	 Gold	 &	 Elizabeth	 Nash,	 State	 Abortion	 Counseling	 Policies	 and	 the	
Fundamental	Principles	of	Informed	Consent,	GUTTMACHER	POL’Y	REV.,	Fall	2007,	at	6,	7.	
166		 Harper	Jean	Tobin,	Confronting	Misinformation	on	Abortion:	Informed	Consent,	Deference,	
and	Fetal	Pain	Laws,	17	COLUM.	J.	GENDER	&	L.	111,	112	(2008).	
167		 Vandewalker,	supra	note	140,	at	5.	
168		 Cf.	Timeline	of	Laws	Related	to	the	Protection	of	Human	Subjects,	NAT’L	INST.	HEALTH	(June	
2002),	http://history.nih.gov/about/timelines_laws_human.html.	
169		 E.g.,	K.	KAUFMAN,	THE	ABORTION	RESOURCE	HANDBOOK	22	(1997).	
170		 Tobin,	supra	note	165,	at	112.		
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of	 the	 profession	 can	 lead	 to	 other	 penalties	 imposed	 by	 medical	 boards	 and	
associations,	including	being	stripped	of	one’s	medical	license.171		
Nevertheless,	as	with	other	instances	of	abortion	exceptionalism,	additional	
informed	 consent	 laws	 specific	 to	 reproductive	 health	 care	 have	 proliferated.172	
Appallingly,	 these	 laws	 mandate	 that	 doctors	 provide	 not	 the	 risks	 that	 the	
medical	profession	believes	to	be	associated	with	abortion	procedures	but	instead	
state-sanctioned	 counseling	 that	 includes:	 1)	 inaccurate	 and	 misleading	
information	 that	 is	 scientifically	 unsubstantiated;	 2)	 irrelevant	 material	 that	 is	
graphic	 in	nature;	and	3)	alternative	options	 for	 treatment	other	 than	 those	 that	
the	patient	is	seeking.	
Abortion-specific	informed	consent	laws	are	some	of	the	most	popular	and	
problematic	 restrictions	 limiting	 women’s	 ability	 to	 access	 abortion	 services.	
Although	such	restrictions	have	been	around	since	the	1980s,173	the	enactment	of	
these	provisions	increased	dramatically	after	the	decisions	handed	down	in	Casey	
and	 Gonzales,	 respectively,	 upheld	 a	 mandatory	 counseling	 requirement	 and	
implied	 both:	 1)	 that	 any	 perception	 (misconstrued,	 overstated,	 or	 otherwise)	 of	
scientific	 uncertainty	 regarding	 the	 safety	 of	 procedures	 warranted	 paternalistic	
government	 oversight	 in	 the	 name	 of	 public	 health;	 and	 2)	 that	 the	 weight	 of	
decisions	to	abort	would	or	could	have	lasting	effects	on	the	psychological	health	
of	mothers.		
Notably,	in	the	Casey	decision	overruling	Thornburgh	v.	American	College	of	
Obstetricians	 &	 Gynecologists,174	 Justice	 O’Connor’s	 language	 in	 the	 majority	
opinion	 required	 that	 all	 informed	 consent	 disclosures	 be	 “truthful	 and	 not	
misleading.”175	 Fifteen	 years	 later,	 Justice	 Kennedy’s	 opinion	 in	Gonzales	 upheld	
the	Partial	Birth	Abortion	Ban	Act,	while	conceding	that	the	Court	could	“find	no	
reliable	data	to	measure	the	phenomenon”	that	women	would	come	to	regret	the	
procedure176	and	reasoning	that	Casey	reaffirmed	that	“[t]he	government	may	use	
its	 voice	 and	 its	 regulatory	 authority	 to	 show	 its	 profound	 respect	 for	 the	 life	
within	 the	 woman.	 A	 central	 premise	 of	 the	 opinion	 was	 that	 the	 Court’s	
precedents	after	Roe	had	‘undervalue[d]	the	State’s	interest	in	potential	life.’”177		
These	 rulings	 emboldened	 state	 legislatures	 to	 pass	 abortion-specific	
informed	 consent	 laws,	many	 under	 the	 title	 of	Women’s	 Right	 to	 Know	Act,178	
																																																												
171		 GEORGE	D.	POZGAR,	LEGAL	ASPECTS	OF	HEALTH	CARE	ADMINISTRATION	362	(2016).	
172		 LR	 Rockett,	 Legal	 Issues	 Affecting	 Confidentiality	 and	 Informed	 Consent	 in	 Reproductive	
Health,	55	J.	AM.	MED.	WOMEN’S	ASSOC.	257,	257	(2000);	Vandewalker,	supra	note	140,	at	3.		
173		 Chinué	Turner	Richardson	&	Elizabeth	Nash,	Misinformed	Consent:	The	Medical	Accuracy	
of	State-Developed	Abortion	Counseling	Materials,	GUTTMACHER	POL’Y	REV.,	Fall	2006,	at	6,	9.	
174		 476	U.S.	477	(1986).	
175		 Planned	Parenthood	of	Southeastern	Pennsylvania	v.	Casey,	505	U.S.	833,	882	(1992).	
176		 Gonzales	v.	Carhart,	550	U.S.	124,	159	(2007).	
177		 Id.	at	157	(citing	Casey,	505	U.S.	at	873)	(alteration	in	original).	
178		 E.g.,	 Women’s	 Right	 to	 Know	 Act,	 AM.	 UNITED	 FOR	 LIFE	 (2012),	 http://www.aul.org/wp-
content/uploads/2012/04/model-womens-right-to-know.pdf;	 see	 also	 ELLIE	 LEE,	 ABORTION,	
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mandating	 disclosure	 of	 specific,	 State-determined	 information	 that	 the	 State	
deemed	germane	to	the	procedure.	Often,	states	also	impose	a	mandatory	waiting	
period179	 for	 the	 woman	 to	 consider	 the	 information	 she	 receives	 in	mandatory	
counseling,	indicating,	without	any	empirical	basis	to	support	the	presumption,180	
that	the	woman	needs	this	additional	time	to	consider	this	information	thoroughly	
in	order	to	determine	her	next	steps.181		
A	 fact	 sheet	 published	 by	 the	 Guttmacher	 Institute	 reported	 that,	 as	 of	
January	 2016,	 “[thirty-eight]	 states	 require	 that	women	 receive	 counseling	before	
an	 abortion	 is	 performed”	 and	 “[twenty-seven]	 of	 these	 states	 detail	 the	
information	 a	 woman	 must	 be	 given.”182	 This	 same	 report	 detailed	 the	 specific	
requirements	 imposed	 by	 each	 state.183	 Remarkably,	 in	 drafting,	 proposing,	 and	
enacting	this	 legislation,	the	states	failed	to	enlist	or	depend	on	the	testimony	of	
medical	 practitioners	 and	 experts.184	 In	 her	 analysis	 of	 the	 flawed	 fact-finding	
process	employed	by	state	legislatures	surrounding	reproductive	health	legislation,	
Caitlin	 Borgmann	 analyzed	 the	 South	 Dakota	 Task	 Force.185	 Her	 research	
demonstrated	 that	 the	 task	 force	 failed	 to	 seek	 out	 and	 take	 into	 account	 the	
opinions	and	testimony	of	medical	experts	and	drew	conclusions	about	the	effect	
of	abortions	on	mental	health	care	based	on	the	testimony	of	an	unrepresentative	
sample	size	of	women.186	Borgmann	notes	that	even	the	pro-life	committeewoman	
who	chaired	the	Task	Force	voted	against	its	ultimate	recommendations.187		
There	 are	 various	 types	 of	 informed	 consent	provisions	 that	 are	 based	on	
junk	 science.	 Disconcertingly,	 these	 laws	mandate	 that	 doctors	 counsel	 patients	
about	risks	that	do	not	exist.	These	provisions188	require	doctors	to	advise	women	
																																																																																																																																																																																	
MOTHERHOOD,	AND	MENTAL	HEALTH:	MEDICALIZING	REPRODUCTION	IN	THE	UNITED	STATES	AND	GREAT	
BRITAIN	130	(2003).	
179		 Vandewalker,	 supra	 note	 140,	 at	 31–33;	 see	 also	 State	 Policies	 in	 Brief:	 Counseling	 and	
Waiting	 Periods	 for	 Abortion,	 GUTTMACHER	 INST.,	
http://guttmacher.org/statecenter/spibs/spib_MWPA.pdf	(last	updated	Jan.	1,	2016).	
180		 Biased	 Counseling	 Against	 Abortion,	 AM.	 CIV.	 LIBERTIES	 UNION	 (Apr.	 11,	 2001),	
https://www.aclu.org/reproductive-freedom/biased-counseling-against-abortion.	
181		 Vandewalker,	 supra	 note	 140,	 at	 13.	 See	 generally	 Maya	 Manian,	 The	 Irrational	Woman:	
Informed	Consent	and	Abortion	Decision-Making,	 16	DUKE	J.	GENDER	L.	&	POL’Y	223	(2009)	(noting	
that	the	Supreme	Court	has	upheld	abortion-specific	waiting	periods	as	ensuring	patients’	informed	
consent).		
182		 State	Policies	in	Brief:	Counseling	and	Waiting	Periods	for	Abortion,	supra	note	178.	
183		 See	id.	at	2–3.	
184		 In	fact,	at	times	states	do	not	even	consult	their	own	records.	See	Becca	Aaronson,	In	State	
Records,	 Little	 Evidence	 to	 Back	 Abortion	 Law,	 TEX.	 TRIB.	 (Sept.	 15,	 2013),	
http://texastribune.org/2013/	
09/15/records-offer-little-evidence-back-new-abortion-la/.	
185		 Borgmann,	supra	note,	2	at	28–29,	29	n.66.	
186		 See	id.	at	37–43.	
187		 Id.	at	43.		
188		 See	 generally	Michael	Mechanic,	Are	 You	 Sure	 You	Want	 An	 Abortion	 (Interactive	Map),	
MOTHER	 JONES	 (Jan./Feb.	 2011),	 http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2011/01/state-abortion-laws-
map	(summarizing	restrictive	state	abortion	provisions).	
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of	 four	 inaccuracies:	 1)	 a	 link	 between	 abortion	 and	 breast	 cancer;189	 2)	 a	 link	
between	 abortion	 and	 depression	 or	 decreased	 quality	 of	 mental	 health	
(sometimes	referred	to	as	“post-abortion	syndrome”);190	3)	a	link	between	abortion	
and	 subsequent	 infertility;191	 and	4)	 the	 likelihood	of	 fetal	pain.192	The	purported	
link	between	abortion	and	breast	cancer	has	been	widely	discredited,193	as	has	the	
causal	relationship	between	abortion	and	depression	(studies	suggest	that	the	best	
indicator	of	mental	health	post-abortion	is	the	mental	health	of	the	woman	before	
the	 procedure).194	 There	 are	 no	 data	 that	 demonstrate	 a	 link	 between	 first-
trimester	abortions	and	subsequent	fertility	problems.195	Although	some	evidence	
indicates	that	later-term	abortions	result	in	slightly	decreased	fertility,196	advances	
in	 the	 safety	of	 second-	 and	 third-trimester	 abortion	procedures	have	drastically	
decreased	this	effect.197	Counseling	regarding	fetal	pain	is	also	not	grounded	in	any	
legitimate	 medical	 knowledge,	 as	 described	 and	 discussed	 in	 the	 previous	
section.198	 These	 various	 counseling	 requirements	 are	 at	 best	 misleading	 and	 at	
worst	untruthful	and	should	therefore	fail	under	the	standard	established	in	Casey.	
The	other	 two	 forms	of	 abortion-specific	 informed	 consent	provisions	 are	
those	 that	 are	 graphic199	 and	 irrelevant	 in	 nature—requiring	 mandatory	
ultrasounds	 and	 the	 description	 of	 the	 gestational	 age	 and	 fetal	 development	 of	
the	 fetus—and	 those	 that	 require	delivery	of	 additional	 information	 relaying	 the	
opinions	 of	 the	 State200	 and	 the	 existence	 of	 alternative	 options201	 that,	 through	
																																																												
189		 Joyce	 Arthur,	How	 Deeply	 Flawed	 Studies	 on	 Abortion	 and	 Breast	 Cancer	 Became	 Anti-
Choice	 Fodder,	 RH	 REALITY	 CHECK	 (Jan.	 9,	 2014,	 9:51	 AM),	
http://rhrealitycheck.org/article/2014/01/09/how-deeply-flawed-studies-on-abortion-and-breast-
cancer-become-anti-choice-fodder/.	
190		 Coutts	&	Resnick,	supra	note	66.	
191		 Vandewalker,	supra	note	140,	at	14–17.	
192		 See	supra	Part	III.C.	
193		 Michael	Mechanic,	 Susan	G.	 Komen	Causes	 Cancer	 (and	Other	 Pro-Life	Myths),	MOTHER	
JONES	(Jan.	20,	2011,	8:02	AM),	http://www.motherjones.com/blue-marble/2011/01/abortion-cancer-
k	
omen-informed-consent.	
194		 Vandewalker,	supra	note	140,	at	16–17.	
195		 Id.	at	14.		
196		 Id.;	 What	 to	 Expect	 with	 Medical	 and	 Surgical	 Abortion,	 U.	 CHI.,	
https://abguide.uchicago.ed	
u/page/what-expect-medication-and-surgical-abortion	(last	visited	Oct.	5,	2015).	
197		 What	to	Expect	with	Medical	and	Surgical	Abortion,	supra	note	195.	
198		 Vandewalker,	supra	note	140,	at	Part	II.C.	
199		 Id.	at	20.	
200		 Id.	at	19–20;	see	also	Certification	of	Voluntary	and	Informed	Consent:	Abortion	Instructions	
and	 Informed	 Consent	 Form,	 KAN.	 DEP’T.	 HEALTH	 &	 ENV’T,	
http://www.kansaswomansrighttoknow.or	
g/download/Certification_of_Informed_Consent_English.pdf	 (last	 visited	Oct.	 5,	 2015)	 (describing	
Kansas’s	legal	requirement	to	describe	a	baby	as	a	“whole,	separately	unique,	human	living	being”).	
201		 Gold	&	Nash,	supra	note	164.	
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funding,	 facilitate	birth	of	 the	 fetus	and,	 later,	child	and	health	care.202	Although	
these	provisions	are	not	based	on	junk	science,	an	understanding	of	the	purpose	of	
informed	 consent	 illustrates	 why	 use	 of	 these	 laws	 and	 “informational	
manipulation”203	are	inappropriate	ways	to	convey	the	State’s	respect	for	life.204		
Leading	 medical	 organizations	 oppose	 these	 abortion-specific	 informed	
consent	provisions,	asserting	that	they	are	often	factually	inaccurate	or	irrelevant	
and	interfere	with	doctors’	abilities	to	use	medical	discretion.205	These	restrictions	
also	 drive	 up	 the	 costs	 for	 women	 in	 two	 ways:	 1)	 requiring	 unnecessary	
ultrasounds	 and	 increasing	 the	 time	 doctors	 must	 spend	 with	 patients,	 adding	
additional	 operating	 expenses;206	 and	 2)	 imposing	 mandatory	 delays	 or	
requirements	 that	 mandate	 counseling	 at	 non	 abortion-providing	 facilities	
requiring	women	to	take	additional	time	off	work	and	to	incur	the	costs	associated	
with	public	or	private	transportation	for	additional	trips	to	obtain	an	abortion.207	
The	informed	consent	regulations	also	perpetuate	misinformation	among	women	
and	voters.208	
	
	
	
	
	
	
																																																												
202		 Within	 informed	 consent	 counseling	 regarding	 childbirth,	 however,	 there	 is	 no	
requirement	to	mention	the	various	risks	associated	with	childbirth.	For	a	description	of	some	of	
the	dangers	see	Valerie	Tarico,	How	America’s	Obsession	with	 ‘Bad	Birth	Control’	Harms	Women,	
RH	REALITY	 CHECK	 (Nov.	 14,	 2014,	 9:56	AM),	 http://rhrealitycheck.org/article/2014/11/14/americas-
obsession-bad-birth-control-harms-women/.	
203		 Gold	&	Nash,	supra	note	164;	see	also	Vandewalker,	supra	note	140,	at	38	n.	205;	Jennifer	Y.	
Seo,	Raising	the	Standard	of	Abortion	Informed	Consent:	Lessons	to	be	Learned	from	the	Ethical	and	
Legal	Requirements	for	Consent	to	Medical	Experimentation,	21	COLUM.	J.	GENDER	&	L.	357	(2011).	
204		 See	Vandewalker,	supra	note	140,	at	10,	51.	But	see	Nadia	N.	Sawicki,	The	Abortion	Informed	
Consent	Debate:	More	Light,	Less	Heat,	21	CORNELL	J.	L.	&	PUB.	POL’Y	1	(2011).		
205		 Leading	 Medical	 Groups	 Oppose	 Obstacles	 to	 Abortion,	 supra	 note	 23;	 see	 also	 Talking	
Points	 on	 State	 Legislation,	 AM.	 CONGRESS	 OBSTETRICIANS	 &	 GYNECOLOGISTS,	
http://www.acog.org/~/media/	
Departments/LARC/TalkingPointsonUltrasoundMandates.pdf?dmc=1&ts=20130709T0142491575	
(last	 visited	 Oct.	 5,	 2015);	 Testimony	 Submitted	 for	 the	 Record	 by	 Hal	 C.	 Lawrence,	 Exec.	 Vice	
President	&	CEO,	Am.	Cong.	of	Obstetricians	and	Gynecologists,	to	the	U.S.	Senate	Comm.	on	the	
Judiciary,	 Hearing	 on	 S.1696,	 The	 Women’s	 Health	 Protection	 Act	 (July	 15,	 2014),	
http://www.acog.org/-/media/Departments/Government-Relations-and-Outreach/20140715S1696T	
estimony.pdf.	
206		 Forced-Ultrasound	 Legislation	 is	 an	 Egregious	 Intrusion	 into	 Medical	 Care,	 NARAL	 PRO-
CHOICE	 AM.	 (Jan.	 1,	 2015),	 http://www.prochoiceamerica.org/media/fact-sheets/abortion-
mandatory-ultrasound.pdf.	
207		 Boonstra	&	Nash,	supra	note	86;	see	also	Vandewalker,	supra	note	140,	at	32–33.	
208		 See	 Policy	 Statements,	 ASS’N	 REPROD.	 HEALTH	 PROF.,	 http://www.arhp.org/about-
us/position-statements	(last	updated	June	30,	2012).	
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III.	 IMPLICATIONS	 FOR	 EVOLVING	HEALTH	CARE	 TECHNOLOGIES	 AND	
CAPABILITIES	
	
“[L]aw	and	order	exist	for	the	purpose	of	establishing	justice	and	.	.	.	when	they	fail	
in	this	purpose	they	become	the	dangerously	structured	dams	that	block	the	flow	
of	social	progress.”	–	Martin	Luther	King,	Jr.209	
	
There	 are	many	 frightening	 implications	 of	 state	 and	 federal	 legislatures’	
poor	 understanding	 and	 unscrupulous	 use	 of	 science	 for	 recent	 and	 potential	
advancements	 in	 various	 areas	 related	 to	 women’s	 reproductive	 health.210	 Most	
evident	 and	 most	 looming	 is	 the	 threat	 of	 increased	 restrictions	 that	 have	 no	
rational	 basis	 in	 protecting	 women’s	 or	 fetal	 health,	 let	 alone	 the	 sufficient	
tailoring	required	to	meet	an	important	“liberty”	or	“privacy”	interest	protected	by	
the	 Constitution,	 and	 that	 serve	 only	 to	 further	 hamper	 access	 to	 reproductive	
health	services.	
Advancements	 in	 assisted	 reproductive	 technologies,211	 genetic	 and	
developmental	 testing	 in	 utero,	 and	 embryological	 and	 stem	 cell	 research	
abound.212	 Increased	 connectivity	 and	 the	 ability	 to	 use	 robotic	 surgical	
instruments	 that	 can	 be	 operated	 from	 a	 distance	 are	 reshaping	 the	 way	 that	
public	 health	 innovators	 are	 thinking	 about	 increasing	 access	 to	 health	 care	 in	
rural	areas.213	Telemedicine214	in	this	and	other	forms	is	becoming	a	reality	and	will	
likely	 soon	 be	 the	 source	 of	 numerous	 legislative	 regulations	 and	 restrictions.215	
Furthermore,	 developments	 in	 contraceptive	 health	 care,	 such	 as	 automatic	
																																																												
209		 Martin	Luther	King,	 Jr.,	 Letter	 from	Birmingham	 Jail	 (Apr.	 16,	 1963),	 reprinted	 in	 26	U.C.	
DAVIS	L.	REV.	835,	842	(1993).		
210		 See	Hutton	Brown,	Miriam	Dent,	L.	Mark	Dyer,	Cherie	Fuzzell,	Anita	Gifford,	Sam	Griffin,	
A.G.	 Kasselberg,	 Jayne	 Workman,	 &	 Melina	 L.	 Cooper,	 Legal	 Rights	 and	 Issues	 Surrounding	
Conception,	Pregnancy,	and	Birth,	39	VAND.	L.	REV.	597	(1986).	
211		 See	Resolve’s	Policy	on	“Personhood”	Legislation,	RESOLVE,	http://resolve.org/about/personh	
ood-legislation.html	(last	updated	Apr.	2012).	
212		 John	 A.	 Robertson,	Abortion	 and	 Technology:	 Sonograms,	 Fetal	 Pain,	 Viability,	 and	 Early	
Prenatal	Diagnosis,	14	U.	PA.	J.	CONST.	L.	327	(2011).	
213		 See,	e.g.,	Heather	Slawson,	Note,	Telemedicine:	The	Affordable	Care	Act’s	Forgotten	Frontier	
of	Rural	Health	Care,	19	HOLY	CROSS	J.L.	&	PUB.	POL’Y	193	(2015).	
214		 Telemedicine	 is	 defined	 as	 “the	 use	 of	 electronic	 communication	 and	 information	
technologies	to	provide	or	support	clinical	care	at	a	distance	with	the	goal	of	improving	a	patient’s	
health.”	 Id.	 at	 194–198;	 see	 also	 What	 is	 Telemedicine?,	 AM.	 TELEMEDICINE	 ASS’N,	
http://americantelem	
ed.org/about-telemedicine/what-is-telemedicine#.VKBFpADB	(last	visited	Oct.	5,	2015).	
215		 See	 generally	 Daniel	 J.	 Gilman,	 Physician	 Licensure	 and	 Telemedicine:	 Some	 Competitive	
Issues	Raised	by	the	Prospect	of	Practicing	Globally	while	Regulating	Locally,	14	J.	HEALTH	CARE	L.	&	
POL’Y	87	(2011)	(explaining	the	issues	inherent	to	telemedicine	law	that	make	it	ripe	for	legislative	
action	 and	 evaluating	 these	 issues);	 B.	 Jesse	Hill,	 Legislative	 Restrictions	 on	 Abortion,	 14	 AMA	 J.	
ETHICS	 133	 (2012)	 (explaining	 some	of	 the	 implications	 of	 legislative	 restrictions	 on	 telemedicine,	
including	how	it	may	impact	abortion	services).	
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delivery	 and	 medicinal	 abortion216	 that	 pose	 no	 danger	 to	 women’s	 health,	 are	
expanding	legal	questions	of	insurance	coverage,	public	funding,	and	prescription	
or	over-the-counter	drug	availability.	
Imagine,	 first,	 for	 instance,	 the	 existence	 of	 an	 automated-delivery	
hormonal	 IUD	device	 that	 can	 sense	 the	presence	of	 sperm	or	 female	hormones	
produced	during	 sex	and	 releases	a	medicine	 that	 targets	 sperm	and	eggs	before	
fertilization	 can	 occur.	 Second,	 imagine	 a	 rural	 town	 with	 only	 one	 physician’s	
assistant	(PA),	but	the	PA	is	part	of	a	network	of	rural	health	care	providers	who	
are	part	of	a	medical	partnership	consisting	of	licensed	physicians	who	are	trained	
abortion	providers.	The	PA	should	be	able	to	examine	the	female	patient,	share	her	
electronic	 medical	 records	 with	 her	 supervising	 physician,	 and	 obtain	 a	
prescription	 for	Mifeprostone	 for	 the	 patient	without	 requiring	 the	 physician	 to	
ever	be	present	or	have	contact	with	the	patient.	Indulge	once	more	and	imagine	a	
third	scenario	in	which	a	hypothetical	third	and	fourth	pregnant	woman	hoping	to	
carry	their	babies	to	term	are	seeking	prenatal	health	services.	This	third	woman	
finds	 out,	 due	 to	 advancements	 in	 genomic	 and	 diseasome217	mapping,	 that	 her	
fetus	 has	 developed	 significant	 impairments	 late-term	 that	 will	 create	 pain	 and	
misery	 for	 the	 future	child	and	his	or	her	 family	 in	addition	 to	 levying	extensive	
costs	 associated	 with	 providing	 care	 for	 such	 a	 child	 or	 person.	 The	 fourth	
pregnant	 woman	 is	 a	 recovering	 addict	 who	 is	 enrolled	 in	 a	 new	 addiction	
treatment	program	that	utilizes	supervised	doses	of	a	controlled	drug	to	manage	
withdrawal	and	monitor	the	health	of	the	mother	and	the	fetus.	The	hypotheticals	
presented	by	the	third	and	fourth	women	described	above	are	already	realities;	the	
others	soon	could	be.	
Although	 these	 technological	 developments	 should	 be	 regarded	 as	
promising	for	expanding	access	to	and	improving	the	quality	of	reproductive	and	
prenatal	health	care,	 the	 trend	 in	 regulating	 the	sphere	of	women’s	 reproductive	
health	with	excessive	and	exceptional	 restrictions	 that	do	not	 rationally	 relate	 to	
any	 substantiated	 medical	 interest	 is	 cause	 for	 concern.	 Advancements	 in	
telemedicine	that	could	reliably	bring	higher-quality	health	care	to	rural	areas	may	
be	 hampered	 merely	 because	 those	 advancements	 serve	 the	 specific	 area	 of	
reproductive	health.		
	
	
																																																												
216		 See	 generally,	Heather	D.	Boonstra,	Medication	Abortion	Restrictions	Burden	Women	and	
Providers—and	Threaten	U.S.	Trend	Toward	Very	Early	Abortion,	GUTTMACHER	POL’Y	REV.,	Winter	
2013,	at	18	(explaining	the	procedures	involved	with	a	medical	abortion).	
217		 The	term	“diseasome”	refers	to	the	study	of	the	intersection	between	disease	and	genetics.	
See	generally	Kwang-Il	Goh	&	In-Geol	Choi,	Exploring	the	Human	Diseasome:	 the	Human	Disease	
Network,	 11	 BRIEFINGS	 IN	 FUNCTIONAL	 GENOMICS	 533	 (2012),	
http://bfg.oxfordjournals.org/content/11/6	
/533	 (describing	 the	 network	 of	 human	 genes	 and	 their	 interaction	with	 various	 proteins	 as	 the	
“diseasome”).	
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IV.	 PROPOSED	SOLUTIONS	
	
“[B]etween	 a	 balanced	 republic	 and	 a	 democracy,	 the	 difference	 is	 like	 that	
between	order	and	chaos.”	–	Chief	Justice	John	Marshall218	
	
Parts	 I	 through	 III	 have	 established	 the	 troubling	 trend	 of	 legislatures’	
misuse	 of	 science	 to	 craft	 laws	 limiting	 women’s	 access	 to	 reproductive	 health	
services,	outlined	the	ways	 in	which	these	restrictions	 impact	women	and	health	
care	 providers,	 and	 recognized	 the	 disturbing	 implications	 of	 permitting	 the	
propagation	of	such	legislation.	This	Part	will	propose	solutions	to	this	emerging	
and	worsening	trend.		
	
	
A.	 Recommended	 Level	 of	 Deference	 in	 Court’s	 Treatment	 of	 Legislative	 Fact-
Finding	
Noting	the	incoherent	standard	by	which	federal	courts	decide	to	defer	to	
legislative	 fact-finding,	 several	 legal	 scholars	 have	 taken	 up	 the	 issue219—
differentiating	 between	 the	 nature	 of	 various	 types	 of	 facts,220	 assessing	 relevant	
political	 principles	 and	 constitutional	 doctrines,221	 and	 evaluating	 the	 respective	
abilities	 of	 government	 branches	 to	 find	 facts222	—in	 order	 to	 propose	workable	
and	 rights-protecting	 theories	 of	 deference.	 Several	 of	 these	 scholars	 have	
examined	 legislative	 fact-finding	 and	 subsequent	 treatment	 of	 these	 facts	 by	 the	
courts	in	the	context	of	laws	restricting	access	to	abortion.		
																																																												
218		 JOHN	MARSHALL,	 THE	 LIFE	 OF	 GEORGE	WASHINGTON	 467	 (Robert	 Faulkner	 &	 Paul	 Carrese	
eds.,	spec.	ed.	for	schools,	Liberty	Fund,	Inc.	2000)	(1838).	
219		 See,	e.g.,	DAVID	L.	FAIGMAN,	CONSTITUTIONAL	FICTIONS:	A	UNIFIED	THEORY	OF	CONSTITUTIONAL	
FACTS	129–33	(2008).		
220		 DONALD	 L.	 HOROWITZ,	 THE	 COURTS	 AND	 SOCIAL	 POLICY	 45–51	 (1977);	 William	 D.	 Araiza,	
Deference	 to	 Congressional	 Fact-Finding	 in	 Rights-Enforcing	 and	 Rights-Limiting	 Legislation,	 88	
N.Y.U.	L.	REV.	878,	Part	I.B	(2013);	John	O.	McGinnis	&	Charles	W.	Mulaney,	Judging	Facts	Like	Law,	
25	CONST.	COMMENT.	69	(2008).		
221		 See	Eric	Berger,	Deference	Determinations	and	Stealth	Constitutional	Decision-making,	98	
IOWA	L.	REV.	 465,	 465	 (2013)	 (“[C]ourts	 should	 examine	 the	 actual	behavior	 and	processes	of	 the	
relevant	governmental	institution	before	deciding	whether	deference	is	appropriate.”);	Eric	Berger,	
In	Search	of	a	Theory	of	Deference:	The	Eighth	Amendment,	Democratic	Pedigree,	and	Constitutional	
Decision-making,	88	WASH.	U.	L.	REV.	1	(2010)	(arguing	that	the	varying	degree	of	deference	among	
courts	 in	 context	 of	 the	 Eighth	 Amendment	 leads	 to	 careless	 and	 opaque	 decision-making);	
Borgmann,	 supra	 note	 2	 (addressing	 the	 Supreme	Court’s	 declining	 standard	 of	 review	 in	major	
abortion	 cases);	 David	 L.	 Faigman,	 Ashutosh	 A.	 Bhagwat,	 &	 Kathryn	 M.	 Davis,	 Amicus	 Brief	 of	
Constitutional	 Law	 Professors	 David	 L.	 Faigman	 and	 Ashutosh	 A.	 Bhagwat,	 et	 al.	 in	 the	 Case	 of	
Gonzales	 v.	Carhart,	 34	HASTINGS	CONST.	L.Q.	69	 (2006)	 (urging	 the	Supreme	Court	 to	 find	 facts	
independently	of	legislatures	in	determining	fundamental	rights);	Aziz	Z.	Huq,	Tiers	of	Scrutiny	in	
Enumerated	Powers	Jurisprudence,	80	U.	CHI.	L.	REV.	575	(2013)	(suggesting	the	abandonment	of	the	
tiered	 approach	 to	 scrutiny	 in	 order	 to	 avoid	 the	 strategic	 subversion	 of	 fundamental	 rights	 by	
legislatures).	
222		 Douglas	Laycock,	A	Syllabus	of	Errors,	105	MICH.	L.	REV.	1169,	1172–77	(2007)	(book	review).	
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Notable	 among	 these	 analyses	 is	 the	 work	 of	 Caitlin	 Borgmann,	 who	
explains,		
	
Justice	and	truth	are	pillars	of	the	good	society,	and	the	courts	play	a	vital	role	in	
ensuring	both.	The	 courts'	 primary	 responsibility	 is	 for	 the	norms	of	 justice,	 but	
implementing	 justice	 depends	 upon	 factual	 truth.	 Laws	 founded	 upon	 untruths	
subvert	 justice.	 Thus,	 when	 courts	 address	 laws	 that	 implicate	 individual	 rights	
like	the	right	to	abortion,	they	must	ensure	that	these	laws	are	based	on	a	sound	
factual	foundation.223		
	
Borgmann	argues	that	the	Supreme	Court	only	began	applying	a	new	standard	of	
giving	a	great	degree	of	deference	to	legislative	fact-finding	in	the	second	Carhart	
case,	 Gonzales	 v.	 Carhart,224	 and	 that	 this	 deference	 departed	 from	 the	 Court’s	
typical	 skepticism	 toward	 provisions	 challenged	 on	 grounds	 involving	 individual	
rights,	which	ordinarily	receive	heightened	scrutiny.225		
Borgmann	 proposes	 a	 theory	 of	 deference	 in	 which	 the	 courts	 conduct	
“selective	 independent	 judicial	 review	 of	 social	 facts	 .	 .	 .	 of	 all	 legislation	 that	
curtails	 important	 individual	 rights	 protected	 by	 the	 federal	 Constitution.”226	
Similarly,	Daniel	Faigman	calls	 for	a	theory	of	deference	to	facts	that	mirrors	the	
skepticism	associated	with	presumptions	of	constitutionality	 in	 tiers	of	 review.227	
Closer	 to	Borgmann’s	proposal	 is	William	Araiza’s	 conclusion	 that	 courts	 should	
defer	 in	 review	 of	 rights-enhancing	 legislation	 and	 conduct	 independent	 fact-
finding	when	assessing	constitutional	challenges	to	rights-limiting	legislation.228		
Fact-finding	 by	 the	 legislature	 plays	 an	 important	 role	 in	 determining	
whether	 there	 is	 an	 issue	 that	 creates	 a	 policy	 interest	 for	 the	 State	 and	 in	
determining	what	sort	of	restrictions	would	work	best	to	achieve	the	legislature’s	
goals.	 If	 courts	merely	accept	 the	 stated	 interest	 as	having	a	valid	basis	 in	 social	
fact	and	determine	 sufficiency	of	 tailoring	by	whether	a	 regulation	unnecessarily	
restricts	unobjectionable	activities	and	not	by	whether	the	proposed	fix	is	sensibly	
related	 to	 the	 purported	 goal,	 then	 they	 are	 not	 taking	 any	 account	 of	 the	
legislative	fact-finding	process.229	
Two	prominent	 justifications	exist	 for	 courts’	deference	 to	 legislative	 fact-
finding.	 The	 first	 justification	 is	 the	 judiciary’s	 respect	 for	 the	 legislating	 power	
																																																												
223		 Borgmann,	supra	note	2,	at	15.	
224		 Id.	at	17;	550	U.S.	124	(2007).	
225		 See	Caitlin	E.	Borgmann,	Rethinking	 Judicial	Deference	 to	Legislative	Fact-Finding,	84	 IND.	
L.J.	1,	50	(2009).	
226		 Id.	at	3.	
227		 See	FAIGMAN,	supra	note	218.	
228		 See	Araiza,	supra	note	219.	
229		 See	Lauren	Paulk,	What	is	an	“Undue	Burden?”	The	Casey	Standard	as	Applied	to	Informed	
Consent	 Provisions,	 20	 UCLA	WOMEN’S	 L.J.	 71,	 103–05	 (2013)	 (explaining	 the	 problematic	 judicial	
treatment	of	the	Undue	Burden	standard	in	Lakey).	
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ascribed	 to	 Congress	 by	 the	 Constitution	 and	 the	 separation	 of	 powers.230	 The	
second	basis	is	that	the	legislature	has	an	inherently	superior	ability	to	find	facts	as	
a	 result	 of	 its	 ability	 to	 convene	 committee	 hearings,	 call	 for	 testimony,	 and	
contribute	 substantial	 amounts	 of	 time	 to	 these	 processes.231	 The	 work	 of	 these	
judicial-deference	 scholars	 rebuts	 these	 presumptions,	 acknowledging,	
respectively,	 the	 courts’	 role	 as	 a	 counter-majoritarian	 check	 on	 democracy	 and	
the	pressures	that	reelection,	executive	influence,	and	partisan	politics	have	on	the	
cognitive	judgments	of	legislators	and	on	legislative	committees.232	Unlike	elected	
legislators,	 federal	 judges	 are	 appointed	 to	 life	 terms	 and	 insulated	 from	 the	
political	 pressures	 of	 party	 affiliation	 and	 accountability	 to	 voters,	 and	 are	
therefore	less	likely	to	be	biased	in	fact-finding	processes.233		
Borgmann	 describes	 the	 particular	 superiority	 of	 ability	 that	 federal	 trial	
courts	possess	in	amassing	an	unbiased	and	legitimate	factual	record,	noting	that	
the	adversarial	process	brings	all	 relevant	 facts	 to	 light,	 that	 the	Federal	Rules	of	
Evidence	prevent	inflammatory	and	irrelevant	hearsay	from	being	considered,	and	
that	the	“reactive	nature	of	the	trial	courts	frees	them	from	a	slavish	devotion	to	a	
pre-set	political	agenda”	in	that	the	role	of	trial	courts	is	“not	to	establish	or	revisit	
precedent,	but	 to	 apply	 it.”234	Furthermore,	 the	 trial	process	has	 various	 features	
“designed	 to	 optimize	 fairness,”	 including	 the	 absence	 of	 bias	 in	 the	 number	 of	
witnesses	that	can	be	called	and	the	court’s	ability	to	seek	information	and	expert	
opinion	outside	of	those	brought	before	it.235	Additionally,	when	trial	courts	collect	
and	review	evidence,	the	same	person	who	considers	all	of	the	information	is	the	
one	making	the	decision.	In	 legislatures,	on	the	other	hand,	the	committees	that	
collect	 and	 distribute	 information	 cannot	 be	 sure	 whether	 elected	 officials	 will	
thoroughly	read	and	examine	it.236		
Trial	courts	are	already	tasked	with	finding	historical	and	adjudicative	facts.	
In	 various	 circumstances,	 though,	 social	 facts	 are	 often	 dispositive	 in	 the	
evaluation	of	a	statute’s	constitutionality.	These	instances	include	the	existence	of	
a	harm	meriting	legislative	 intervention;	the	rationality	of	the	proposed	policy	to	
achieve	 the	 legislature’s	 purported	 goal;	 and	 the	 law’s	 over-inclusion	 of	
unobjectionable,	unrelated,	or	constitutionally-protected	behaviors.	
																																																												
230		 Borgmann,	supra	note	224,	at	16–18.		
231		 Id.	at	18–21.		
232		 Id.	 at	 35–46;	 see	 also	 Jessica	Mason	 Pieklo,	Why	We	May	 See	Different	Outcomes	 in	 the	
Wisconsin	 and	 Alabama	 TRAP	 Trials,	 RH	 REALITY	 CHECK	 (June	 11,	 2014,	 10:23	 AM),	
http://rhrealitychec	
k.org/article/2014/06/11/may-see-different-outcomes-wisconsin-alabama-trap-trials/	 (citing	 Judge	
Posner’s	7th	circuit	opinion	upholding	federal	trial	court’s	decision	to	strike	down	Wisconsin	TRAP	
laws	in	which	he	makes	the	case	for	court-appointed	medical	experts).	
233		 See,	e.g.,	Borgmann,	supra	note	224,	at	6	n.28,	35–46.		
234		 Id.	at	41.		
235		 Id.	at	43–44.		
236		 Id.	at	42–43.		
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Recognizing	both	the	frequency	with	which	state	restrictions	are	challenged	
in	 and	 enjoined	 by	 federal	 courts	 and	 the	 various	 examples	 of	 state	 legislatures’	
inadequacies	at	evaluating	social	 facts	of	a	scientific	nature,237	 federal	trial	courts	
should	 engage	 in	 independent	 fact-finding	when	 evaluating	 the	 constitutionality	
of	laws	that	are	rights-restricting,	and	federal	appellate	courts	should	consider	and	
afford	 appropriate	 deference	 to	 the	 factual	 record	 amassed	 by	 the	 trial	 courts	
rather	than	to	the	one	created	by	the	legislature.	Such	a	policy	would	promote	two	
ends.	First,	 it	would	ensure	 that	 restrictions	passed	 in	 the	name	of	public	health	
have	 legitimate	 medical	 bases,	 thereby	 preventing	 bad	 science	 from	 being	
enshrined	in	the	law	by	virtue	of	stare	decisis.238	Second,	it	would	set	a	standard	of	
fact-finding	 that	 enables	 a	 clearer	 application	 of	 the	 undue	 burden	 standard	 by	
forcing	courts	to	consider	the	purpose	of	the	legislation	and	the	contributing	social	
factors	 that	 affect	 whether	 women	 are	 unduly	 burdened	 by	 reproductive	 health	
restrictions	(i.e.	whether	the	burden	imposed	is	sufficiently	counterbalanced	by	a	
legitimate,	 constitutional	 furtherance	 of	 State	 interests).	 Both	 of	 these	 effects	 of	
adhering	to	this	proposed	model	of	deference	would	appropriately	fit	the	language	
of	Casey	 that	 required	any	analysis	of	 restrictions	on	abortion	“to	give	some	real	
substance	to	the	woman’s	liberty.”239	
	
	
B.	 Right	to	Medical	Decision	Making	
Apart	from	changing	the	standard	of	deference	given	to	the	legislative	fact-
finding	process,	 there	 are	 other	potential	 avenues	 for	 addressing	 the	problem	of	
legislatures	 misusing	 science	 to	 regulate	 women’s	 ability	 to	 access	 adequate	
reproductive	health	care.	The	first	and	most	protective	option	would	be	for	courts	
to	recognize	implicit	rights	to	(or	for	states	to	enshrine	within	their	constitutions	
an	explicit	right	to)	medical	decision-making.	Such	a	right	would	be	attractive	to	
individuals	across	the	political	spectrum	(recall	“death	panels”),	would	be	based	on	
the	 societal	 interests	 of	 autonomy240	 and	 the	 right	 to	 contract,	 and	 could	 be	
reasonably	 based	 on	 any	 constitutional	 provision	 articulating	 liberty,	 self-
determination,	 or	 privacy.241	 This	 right	 would	 guarantee	 non-interference	 with	
health	care	beyond	regulations	imposed	for	malpractice,	informed	consent,	and	by	
national	medical	 boards,	 242	 and	would	 be	 in	 accordance	with	 the	UN	Universal	
																																																												
237		 See	supra	Part	II.		
238		 Borgmann,	supra	note	2,	at	55.	
239		 Planned	Parenthood	of	Southeastern	Pennsylvania	v.	Casey,	505	U.S.	833,	869	(1992).		
240		 See	 generally	 ERIN	 NELSON,	 LAW,	 POLICY,	 AND	 REPRODUCTIVE	 AUTONOMY	 11–31	 (2013)	
(explaining	the	importance	of	autonomy	politically,	philosophically,	and	historically).	
241		 See	 Caitlin	 E.	 Borgmann,	 Abortion,	 the	 Undue	 Burden	 Standard,	 and	 the	 Evisceration	 of	
Women’s	Privacy,	16	WM.	&	MARY	J.	WOMEN	&	L.	291,	305–307	(2010).	
242		 Cf.	 Hill,	 supra	 note	 17,	 at	 502	 (arguing	 that	 abortions	 should	 be	 treated	 like	 any	 other	
medical	procedure	and	that	the	right	to	make	medical	decisions	should	be	a	negative	right	instead	
of	a	positive	right).	
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Declaration	 of	 Human	 Rights	 that	 provides	 a	 similar	 right	 and	 to	 which	 this	
country	is	a	signatory.243	
	
	
C.	 Advocacy	and	Engagement	of	Media	and	the	Populace	
Thus	 far,	 the	 recommended	 solutions	 for	 this	 problem	 of	 legislatures’	
misuse	of	 science	have	 focused	on	 the	 first	of	 two	checks	on	 the	 legislature:	 the	
court’s	 power	 of	 judicial	 review.	 Educating	 the	 citizens	who	 elect	 the	 legislature	
provides	 a	 second,	 democratic	 check.	 Research	 in	 political	 economics	 and	
sociology	 demonstrates	 that	 indicators	 of	 effectiveness	 sway	 voters	 in	 election	
determinations.244	 Therefore,	 increased	 attention	 by	 the	media	 to	 this	 troubling	
trend	and	more	effective	messaging	by	advocacy	organizations	can	play	a	 role	 in	
preventing	 harmful	 legislation	 from	 going	 into	 effect245	 and	 holding	 legislators	
accountable.		
One	emerging	campaign	 trying	 to	do	 just	 this	 is	 the	 increasing	use	of	 the	
hashtag	#sciencenotstigma	on	Twitter	and	other	social	networks	to	address	misuse	
of	 science	 in	 various	 areas	 of	 the	 law,	 but	 specifically	 to	 challenge	 the	 “crack	
babies”	myth	and	 the	criminalization	of	pregnant	women	who	use	drugs	or	 seek	
rehabilitative	 services.246	 This	 campaign,	 started	 by	 National	 Advocates	 for	
Pregnant	Women,	has	taken	off	on	social	media	and	been	used	to	promote	various	
ends.	 Other	 reproductive	 health	 organizations	 have	 established	 projects	 with	
similar	 goals:	 1)	 the	 “False	 Witness”	 reports	 by	 RH	 Reality	 Check247	 document	
instances	of	misuse	of	science	by	politicians	and	advocates	by	profiling	individuals	
who	 testify	on	 the	validity	of	unsubstantiated	medical	 claims	 in	 support	of	 anti-
choice	 legislation;	 and	 2)	 the	 “1	 in	 3”	 Let’s	 Talk	 About	 Abortion	 Campaign	
facilitates	conversations	about	abortion	in	order	to	destigmatize	the	procedure	by	
sharing	the	stories	of	everyday	women,	thereby	educating	the	public	with	statistics	
																																																												
243		 G.A.	Res.	217	(III)	A,	Universal	Declaration	of	Human	Rights	(Dec.	10,	1948).	
244		 E.g.,	Gerard	Padró	i	Miquel	&	James	M.	Snyder,	Jr.,	Legislative	Effectiveness	and	Legislative	
Careers,	 31	 LEGIS.	 STUD.	 Q.	 347,	 372	 (2006)	 (“[S]uperior	 effectiveness	 yields	 electoral	 benefits	 for	
legislators	in	the	form	of	higher	reelection	rates	and	higher	probabilities	of	being	unchallenged.”);	
see	also	Shigeo	Hirano	&	James	M.	Snyder	Jr.,	Primary	Elections	and	the	Quality	of	Elected	Officials,	
9	Q.J.	POL.	SCI.	473	(2014).		
245		 For	 a	 good	 example	 of	 this	 type	 of	 advocacy,	 see	 Loren	 Siegel,	 Reproductive	 Justice:	 A	
Communications	Overview,	OPPORTUNITY	AGENDA	(Sept.	10,	2010),	http://opportunityagenda.org/file	
s/field_file/2010.09.10ReproductiveJustice-CommunicationsOverview.pdf.	
246		 E.g.,	 The	 New	 Moral	 Panic	 Over	 Drug-Dependent	 Babies,	 NAT’L	 ADVOC.	 FOR	 PREGNANT	
WOMEN	 (June	 24,	 2014),	
http://advocatesforpregnantwomen.org/featured/the_new_moral_panic_over_drug	
dependent_babies.php.	
247		 False	Witnesses,	RH	REALITY	CHECK,	http://rhrealitycheck.org/false-witnesses/	(last	visited	
Oct.	5,	2015).	
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demonstrating	 the	 widespread	 use	 of	 the	 procedure	 and	 providing	 a	 national	
network	of	support	for	women.248	
The	pro-choice	movement’s	 failure	 to	effectively	engage	 the	public	and	 to	
engage	 the	 media	 in	 recent	 decades	 is	 a	 facet	 of	 this	 problem	 that	 cannot	 be	
ignored.	 A	 “we	 won”	 mentality	 fostered	 apathy	 among	 supporters	 of	 abortion	
rights	for	decades	and	allowed	creeping	regulations	to	dismantle	these	rights	and	
women’s	 access	 to	 health	 care.	 Moreover,	 for	 decades	 the	 reproductive	 rights	
movement	failed	to	encompass	the	 intersectional	concerns	of	all	women	and	has	
permitted	 privilege	 to	 corrupt	 the	 social	movement.	 Increased	 attempts	 to	 form	
and	 maintain	 intersectional	 alliances	 will	 embolden	 the	 effort	 to	 realize	 the	
protection	of	the	rights	of	those	of	all	socioeconomic	classes,	those	in	prison,	and	
those	of	various	backgrounds.249	This	is	the	essence	of	a	true	reproductive	justice	
framework.250	
	
	
D.	 Other	
Other	options	 for	solutions	 include	building	on	cases	 that	apply	a	proper,	
elevated	 undue	 burden	 standard,251	 encouraging	 the	 passage	 of	 legislation	 that	
leads	to	the	adoption	of	merit	selection	systems	for	state	judicial	appointments,252	
and	the	passage	of	the	Women’s	Health	Protection	Act	by	the	US	Congress.253		
																																																												
248		 Advocates	for	Youth,	1	in	3	Campaign,	http://www.1in3campaign.org/en/	(last	visited	Oct.	5,	
2015).	
249		 See	 Moving	 in	 a	 New	 Direction:	 A	 Proactive	 State	 Policy	 Resource	 for	 Promoting	
Reproductive	 Health,	 Rights,	 and	 Justice,	 CTR.	 FOR	 REPRODUC.	 RTS.	 (Dec.	 22,	 2014),	
http://reproductiverights.org/sit	
es/crr.civicactions.net/files/documents/US-PAPS-Compendium-final-SM.pdf.	
250		 Loretta	 Ross,	 What	 is	 Reproductive	 Justice,	 PRO-CHOICE	 EDUC.	 PROJECT,	
http://www.protectc	
hoice.org/section.php?id=28	(last	visited	Oct.	5,	2015).	
251		 See	Emma	Freeman,	Giving	Casey	Its	Bite	Back:	The	Role	of	Rational	Basis	Review	in	Undue	
Burden	Analysis,	48	HARV.	C.R.-C.L.	L.	REV.	279,	Part	III	(2013);	Paulk,	supra	note	228,	at	109;	Caitlin	
E.	Borgmann,	In	Abortion	Litigation	it’s	the	Facts	that	Matter,	127	HARV.	L.	REV.	F.	149	(Feb.	6,	2014),		
http://harvardlawreview.org/2014/02/in-abortion-litigation-its-the-facts-that-matter/.	
252		 See	 generally	Dawn	 Johnsen,	State	Court	 Protection	 of	Reproductive	Rights:	 The	Past,	 the	
Perils,	and	the	Promise,	29	COLUM.	J.	GENDER	&	L.	41,	45–46	(explaining	that	anti-abortion	activists	
have	 been	 pushing	 for	 direct	 elections	 of	 state	 judges	 instead	 of	merit	 selection	 systems);	 Alicia	
Bannon,	Eric	Velasco,	Linda	Casey,	&	Lianna	Reagan,	The	New	Politics	of	Judicial	Elections	2011–12:	
How	New	Waves	of	Special	 Interest	Spending	Raised	 the	Stakes	 for	Fair	Courts,	BRENNAN	CTR.	 FOR	
JUST.	 27–37	 (Oct.	 2013),	
http://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/publications/New%20Politics%	
20of%20Judicial%20Elections%202012.pdf	 (describing	 merit	 selection	 systems	 and	 the	 problems	
states’	 are	 having	 with	 implementing	 such	 systems	 effectively);	 Joanna	 Shepherd	 &	 Michael	 S.	
Kang,	 Skewed	 Justice:	 Citizens	 United,	 Television	 Advertising,	 and	 State	 Supreme	 Court	 Justices’	
Decisions	in	Criminal	Cases,	AM.	CONST.	SOC’Y	(2014),	http://skewedjustice.org/	(tracing	the	money	
that	has	flooded	into	state	judicial	elections	in	the	wake	of	the	Citizens	United	decision).	
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CONCLUSION	
	
“Truth	never	lost	ground	by	enquiry.”	–	William	Penn254	
	
This	Note	has	 examined	 the	misuse	of	 junk	 science	by	 state	 legislators	 in	
regulating	women’s	reproductive	health.	Documenting	several	different	forms	that	
such	 provisions	 take—including	 TRAP	 laws,	 the	 criminalization	 of	 substance	
abuse	by	pregnant	women,	fetal	pain	abortion	bans,	and	informed	consent	laws—
and	the	opposition	to	such	laws	by	leading	medical	organizations,	along	with	their	
impact	on	women	and	physicians,	this	Note	has	also	analyzed	the	developments	in	
federal	legal	doctrine	that	shaped	the	current	state	of	the	law	and	both	permitted	
and	prompted	the	passage	of	anti-choice	legislation.	In	order	to	illustrate	further	
the	 troubling	nature	of	 this	 legislative	 trend,	 this	paper	also	briefly	 analyzed	 the	
potential	 implications	 of	 permitting	 scientifically-challenged	 legislators	 to	
continue	 to	 regulate	 future	medical	 technologies,	 treatment	methodologies,	 and	
pharmaceutical	developments.	
This	worsening	trend	diminishes	access	to	reproductive	health	care,	drives	
up	costs	of	abortion	services,	and	impinges	on	the	medical	discretion	of	physicians	
and	the	physician-patient	relationship.	With	hundreds	of	pieces	of	state	legislation	
passed	in	the	last	few	years	alone,	it	is	unlikely	that	either	the	poor	maternal	and	
infant	health	figures	or	the	low	quality	of	prenatal	care	documented	by	the	WHO	
and	the	National	Institutes	of	Health	will	improve.255	
Noting	 that	 the	 source	 of	 this	 problem	 is	 the	 oversight	 and	 misuse	 of	
science	in	the	legislative	fact-finding	process	and	courts’	subsequent	deference	to	
this	 process	 when	 laws	 are	 challenged,	 this	 Note	 primarily	 recommends	 that	
courts	 decrease	 their	 deference	 to	 legislative	 fact-finding	 in	 rights-limiting	
legislation,	 in	 accordance	with	 the	 courts’	 position	 as	 a	 fact-finder	 and	 counter-
majoritarian	check	on	democracy,	along	with	a	variety	of	other	potential	solutions.	
Other	 recommendations	 include	 finding	 that	 state	 and	 federal	 constitutions	
implicitly	protect	a	right	to	medical	decision-making	as	an	aspect	of	due	process	
liberty,	increasing	the	accuracy	of	reporting	on	failures	in	legislative	competence,	
and	implementing	more	effective	messaging	about	the	increasing	efforts	to	restrict	
women’s	rights	to	reproductive	health	care	of	their	choice.	Each	of	these	measures	
will	 contribute	 to	 protecting	 the	 integrity	 of	 science	 and	 justice,	 while	 assuring	
women’s	access	to	necessary	and	constitutionally-protected	medical	care.	
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